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ABSTRACT

This study attempts to determine the extent that Dakota
territorial and North Dakota State governors have exercised the
gubernatorial veto.

The approach is historical.

The development

of the gubernatorial veto is outlined, the state constitutional
provisions concerning it are presented, and individual performances
by governors are indicated.

A more detailed account of the veto

exercised by the current Governor, William L. Guy, is given.
Dakota Territory was created with the governor having an
absolute veto over acts of the legislature.

Later Congress granted

the legislature the power to override a veto.

Ten territorial

governors used the veto and a number of vetoes were overridden by
the legislatures.

The item veto was denied to territorial governors.

When North Dakota became a State the governor was granted
the full veto and an item veto over appropriation bills, subject to
legislative overriding

by a two-thirds roll call vote.

veto applied to initiated or referred measures.

Neither

Later the governor

was granted veto power:'over the State Industrial Commission.
Evidence indicates that 523 vetoes have been issued by North
Dakota governors.
action.

Only nineteen have been overridden by legislative

One veto was sustained by court action.

been abused by any governor.

The veto has not

A large number of vetoes have been in

the public interest.
It is recommended that governors be granted more time to

vii

study legislation, reduce items in appropriation bills, and be
elected with the lieutenant governor as a team.
of the legislature are also advocated.

Annual sessions

INTRODUCTION

One of the most x^idely discussed weapons in the legislative
arsenal of North Dakota governors has been the executive veto.

This

weapon has been available to the governors of the Dakota Territory as
well as the State of North Dakota.
This study is an attempt to determine to what extent the
Dakota territorial and North Dakota State governors have exercised the
gubernatorial veto.

The approach is historical, that is, it traces

the development of the veto power of Dakota Territory and North Dakota
State governors.
Research in North Dakota politics is a great experience
especially on the gubernatorial veto.

Because there has been so little

done on the governor's veto power, the researcher has an advantage of
plowing a virgin terrain of inquiry.

On the other hand, there are

handicaps to obtaining accurate information.

A number of original

documents pertaining to the veto were destroyed in the North Dakota
Capitol building fire.

The early Legislative Assembly law books do

not record the number of vetoes or the reasons for the vetoes.

The

early session journals of the House and Senate are not consistent in
the information on the veto.

The newspaper sources also contain a

number of discrepencies and omissions.

What is recorded in this

paper is information taken from available sources, determined to be
the most accurate by this researcher.

1

CHAPTER I

THE GUBERNATORIAL VETO IN THE DAKOTA TERRITORY

The term "veto" has been traced to ancient Rome, where the
tribune of the plebs had the power to annul or suspend the acts of
other public authorities.

The term "veto" (I forbid) was used by the

tribune to cancel any command of a consul which infringed upon the
liberties of a citizen.

This power was gradually extended to other

administrative acts and even to decrees of the Roman Senate.
The veto power of American governors is derived from the
legislative power of the British Crown.

In Britain the king's

approval was necessary for a bill to be enacted and without this
approval a bill was not a law.^
When the English Colonies were established in America, the
approval or disapproval of legislation by the governor or proprietor
was found, to some degree, in two of the three types of colonies.

In

the charter colonies, the elected governors did not have the power to
disapprove acts of the legislatures.

In the proprietary colonies, the

proprietor exercised the power of disapproval; and in his absence this
power was delegated to his deputy.

In the royal colonies, which were

the most numerous, the appointed governors had an absolute veto over
the acts of the legislature.

Even if the governor of the colony

^-John A. Fairlie, "The Veto Power of the State Governor,"
American Political Science Review, XI (August, 1917), p. 473•
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approved the acts of the assembly, the king might later disallow
them because of his final veto over acts of the colonial legislature.
Some acts of the assemblies required the approval of the king in
council.^
Both the colonial governors and the British government used the
power of disapproving colonial laws.

This led to a great deal of

discontent among the colonial people.

In New York, of the bills

passea in the colonial period, eight were disapproved by the governor
and sixteen were disallowed by the Crown.

The disallowance of laws

by the king in council was mentioned first of the grievancies listed
in the Declaration of Independence.
This distrust and opposition to the governor and to the royal
veto appeared in the early state constitutions.

These state constitu

tions restricted the powers of the governor and invested in the
legislature almost absolute power.

Only three of the thirteen original

states made any provision in their state constitutions for a veto of
acts of the legislature.

South Carolina was the first to give the

governor veto power with its temporary constitution of 1776.

It gave

the governor an absolute veto over acts of the legislature, but two
years later it revised its constitution and omitted the veto power
entirely.

The other two' states. New York and Massachusetts, each

provided for a modified and qualified negative on legislation.
Under the New York Constitution of 1??7, a provision for a
council of revision, made up of the governor, the chancellor and the
judge of the supreme court, was created.

All bills passed by the

^Ibid., p. 474. See S. B. Greene: The Provincial Governor,
pp. 6, 13, 14, 162-165, for detail on colonial government veto powrer.

legislature were sent to this council.

The council had ten days in

which they could return any bill with their objections in writing to
the legislature.

But if each house passed by a two-thirds vote of all

the members of each house a returned bill, such a bill became law.
Bills not returned within ten days or the adjournment of the legis
lature prevented return, became law at the beginning of the next
session.-^

Thomas Jefferson, in his plan of government for Virginia

in 1783. proposed a council of revision similar to New York.*4In the Massachusetts State Constitution of 1780, the veto power .
of the governor was in limited form.

All bills and resolves were

submitted to the governor for his approval or disapproval.

The bills

and resolves disapproved by the governor were to be returned to the
legislature within five days along with the governor’s objections.
This legislation could be reconsidered and repassed by a two-thirds
vote of the members of each house of the legislature.-^
The growing distrust of unchecked legislative supremacy was
first reflected in the Federal Convention of 1787.^

The people who

controlled the convention preferred the executive veto as established
in Massachusetts to the mixed form of New York.

The action of the

Federal Convention greatly influenced the subsequent action of the
states.'’ The President of the United States was vested with a

3Ibid., p . 475•
^Arthur N. Holcombe, State Government of the United States
(New York: Macmillan Co., 193l), p. 58 .
•^Fairlie, p.

475 .

^Holcombe, p. 115.
'’ibid., p. 116.
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qualified negative on legislation similar, in the main, to the power
of the governor of Massachusetts.

This was undoubtedly a factor in

the gradual extension of the veto power of the state governors.®
It was a very slow extension.

Between 1793 and 1812, no state

o
conferred the power of veto on the governor.7

This condition was

brought about by the rising tide of democracy in the states.^
Another factor contributing to the slow development was the rise of
the Jeffersonian Republicans in opposition to the centralized policy
of the Federalists.^
Since 1812 the distrust of the governors veto has diminished
so that every new state admitted to the Union, except Vest Virginia,
has provided for some type of gubernatorial veto power over legislative bills. ^

The general adoption of the veto in the new states

may be due in part to the fact that Congress gave the territorial
governors this power over measures of the territorial legislatures.13
Since the Civil War the governors veto has been extended to
all but one state of the Union.

North Carolina is the only state

which fails to give the governor the veto power.^
The veto power of the territorial governors was established

®Fairlie, pp. ^75-^76.
9Ibid., p.

476.

■^Holcombe, p. 116.
^-Fairlie, p.

476.

-'-^Frank W. Prescott, "The Executive Veto In American States,"
Western Political Quarterly. Ill (March, 1950), p. 98.
^Fairlie, p. 4-77*
•^Book of the States 19&J— 65 . Vol. XV (Chicago: The Council of
State Government, 196 k), pp. 58-59*
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by the Ordinance of 1787 which, in fact, gave them an absolute
negative over the laws passed by the territorial legislatures.
Section 11 of the Ordinance of 1787 states:
The general assembly, or legislature, shall consist of
the governor, legislative council, and a house of representa
tives.
The governor, legislative council and house of representa
tives shall have authority to make laws in all cases for the
good government of the district, not repugnant to the principles
and articles in this ordinance established and declared. And
all bills, having passed by a majority in the house, and by a
majority in the council, shall be referred to the governor for
his assent; but no bill, or legislative act whatever, shall be
of any force without his assent. The governor shall have
power to convene, prorogue, and dissolve the general assembly
when, in his opinion, it shall be expedient.15
There were some people who wanted part of the governor's
power changed to allow him the veto, but not the power to dissolve
the legislature.-^

By the time that the territory of Dakota was

created by Congress on March 2, 1861,^

the veto power of territorial

governors was still absolute, but the governors no longer had the
power to dissolve the territorial legislative assemblies.

The

governor could veto acts of the legislature, but the legislature
could not override the governor's veto.

When the legislature

adjourned, bills vetoed by the governor could not become law.

All

bills not signed by the governor at adjournment could also not

^William MacDonald, Select Documents Illustrative of the
History of the United States 1776-1861 (New York: Macmillan Co.,
1897) . p. "25.
-^Debates of Congress 1789-1856 (New York:
1857), pp. 9-2-46.

D. Aopelton and Co.,

David W. Parker, Calendar of Papers in Washington Archives
Relating to the Territories of the United States (to 1873) (Washington:
Published by the Carnegie Institution of ’Washington, 1911), pp. 54-55*
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become law.

That is to say, the territorial governors had an

absolute veto as well as a pocket veto.

1 ft

When President Lincoln signed Senate Bill 562, "An Act to
Provide a Temporary Government for the Territory of Dakota and to
Create the Office of Surveyor - General Therein," the veto power
of the Dakota Territory governor was established in Section 2 of
the a c t . T h e act reads:
That the executive power and authority in and over said
Territory of Dakota, shall be vested in a governor, who shall
hold his office for four years, and until his successor shall
be appointed and qualified, unless sooner removed by the presi
dent of the United States. The governor shall reside within
said territory, shall be commander-in-chief of the militia
thereof, shall perform the duties and receive the emoluments
of superintendent of Indian affairs, and shall approve all
laws passed by the legislative assembly before they shall take
effect; he may grant pardons for offences against the law of
said territory, and reprieves for offences against the laws
of the United States until the decision of the president can
be made known thereon; he shall commission all officers who
shall be appointed to office under the laws of said territory,
and shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed.20
During the second session of the

36th Congress, i860,

Representative Galuzha Groxj of Pennsylvania, a member of the House
Committee on Territories, recommended a change in the law organizing
territories.

His recommendation would have allowed the territorial

legislatures to overrule the governor's veto by a majority of the
legislature.2-*- But his suggestion was not enacted into law at this

-*®Prescott, The Executive Veto in American States, p. 105»
^ Congressional Globe, 2nd Session,

1860-61 , p. 1362.

36th Congress, Part 2,

^Territory of Dakota, Session Laws, 1862, p. 22.
^ Congressional Globe, 2nd Session,
1860-61, p. 81.

36th Congress, Part 1,
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time and the Territory of Dakota x*as admitted with the governor of
the territory having an absolute veto.
From the first session of the Dakota Territorial Legislature
through the eighteenth session, the governors of the territory used
the message veto as well as the pocket veto.

Colonel Clement A.

Lounsberry reported in his North Dakota History and People:
This first session of the Legislative Assembly was rather
exciting, and at sometime the relations between the legislative
and the executive departments were considerably strained over
the governor's determination to prevent the issue of any bonded
indebtedness by counties or municipal corporations, unless the
same had been approved by a vote of the people, the governor
deeming this precaution necessary to keep down an incipient
spirit of wildness, tending to repudiation. The records of
the territory show that the governor withheld his signature
to nearly or quite one-third of the acts passed by the Legis
lative Assembly.22
The first territorial governor of Dakota was William Jayne
from Illinois, who not only exercised the veto power but some other
power as well.

Edna LaKoore Waldo relates that:

William Jayne, played a lone hand, •wielding the big stick with
his veto power and where that did not suffice, resorting to
fisticuffs on downtown streets as did the best of his
colleagues.23
Jayne, who was the founder of the Dakota Republican Party,

at the

time of the Second Legislature had absolute power under the Organic
Act to veto any bill, .and there was no appeal.25

^clement A. Lounsberry, North Dakota History and People
Outlines of American History (Chicago: The S. J. Clarke Publishing Co.,
1917), p. 372.

23Edna LaMoore Waldo, Dakota An Informal Study of Territorial
Days Gleaned From Contemp0 rary~ Ke'wsr,aners~TBismarck: Capitol Publishing
Co., 1932), p. 2^7.
2%loward Roberts Lamar, Dakota Territory, 1861-1869; A Study of
Frontier Politics (New Haven: Yale University press, 1956)7P» 69.
25oeorge W. Kingsbury, Dakota Territory, Vol. I (Chicago: The
S. J. Clarke Publishing Co., 1915), P* 26>2.
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Governor Jayne ran into political opposition, over his use of
the veto, at the People's Union Territorial Convention in 1862.

A

part of the party platform contained a plank on the use of the veto:
That the present unlimited veto power of the governor
strips the Legislature of its free expression of the will of
the people, and we therefore favor amending the Organic Act
by Congress, so as to confer upon the governor only the usual
two-thirds veto power; and to give to the people, through
their Legislature, control of the public printing.2°
On-January 3* 1863, the second session of the Legislative
Assembly of the Dakota Territory approved a message to the United
States Congress asking for a change in the act granting a temporary
government for the Territory of Dakota.

The Legislative Assembly

desired Congress to change the unlimited veto power of the governor
by allowing the legislature the power to pass laws by the usual twothirds majority.
Relief from the absolute veto of the Dakota Territorial
governor came on March 2, I863.

The Congress approved an amendment to

the Organic Act by amending Section Two to read:
That every bill which shall have passed the Legislative
Assembly shall, before it become a law, be presented to the
Governor of the Territory; if he approve, he shall sign it;
but if not, he shall return it, with his objections, to the
house in which it originated, wh o .shall enter the objections
at large on their journal and proceed to reconsider it. If,
after such reconsideration, two-thirds of that house shall
agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the
objections to the other house, by which it shall likewise be
reconsidered; and if approved by two-thirds of that house,
it shall become a law. But in all such cases the votes of
both houses shall be determined by,yeas and nays, to be
entered on the journal of each house respectively. If any
bill shall not be returned by the Governor within three days

^ Ibid., p.

223.

^Territory of Dakota, Session Laws, I863, p. 272.
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(Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him,
the same shall be a law in like manner as if he has signed it,
unless the Assembly, by adjournment, prevent its return, in
which case it shall not be a law.23
Under the amended law the governor still retained the message veto as
well as the pocket veto, but the legislature could now override the
governor's veto during the legislative session.
The law passed by Congress that allowed the territorial
legislature of Dakota Territory to override the governor's veto was
included in the bill to provide a temporary government for the
Territory of Colorado.2^
Territory of Kansas.

This law corresponded to the law of the

30

On June 20, 1874, the United States Congress revised the veto
power of the governor of the territory by clarifying when the legis
lature adjourned and changed some of the wording in the section dealing
with the veto power.

The principal changes, found in Section 1842 of

the revised statutes of the United States of 1874, required the names
of the members of the legislature voting for or against overriding of
the governor's veto to be entered in the journals of each house.

Also,

the words "sine die" were added in the sentence pertaining to the
legislature adjourning and preventing a bill from being returned by
the governor to the legislature.-^"
The ten men who served as governors of the Dakota Territory all

2®Territory of Dakota, Session laws, 1867, pp. XLII-XLIII.
^ C ongressional Globe Appendix, 37th Congress, 3^8 Session,
1863, p. 200.
30congressional Globe Appendix, 33r8 Congress, 1st Session,
v 23, 1853-54, p. 2229.
3lTerritory of Dakota, Session Laws, I 885, pp. IV-V.
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had the veto power and there are indications that all of them, with the
possible exception of Governor Arthur Millette, exercised this power
with various degrees of intensity.

Likewise, after Congress had

granted the territorial legislature the power to override the
governor's veto, the legislature used this power which created some
conflict between the executive and the legislative branches of govern
ment.
A part of this conflict between the executives and the legis
latures was due to the appointment of outsiders to the office of
governor.

Of the first four governors appointed, only Governor Newton

Edmunds was an old resident of the territory to be named.

32

Of the

eleven men appointed to the governorship of the Dakota Territory, only
three were considered as residents of Dakota, and two of the three were
the last two governors of the territorial government.

33

One other condition that contributed to the effectiveness of
the legislatures resistance to appointive officers was the legal limits
placed upon their numbers.

The small number of members allowed in

each house of the legislature enabled the legislators to work together
harmoniously to override the governor's vetoes.

The Bismarck Tribune

of February 25, 1881, complained:
The members of both houses seem to have combined against
the executive, . . . but when Dakota becomes a state and the
membership of the legislature is enlarged, vetoes will begin
to be considered as they deserve.3^3

3^Waldo, p. 256.
Earl S. Pomeroy, The Territories and the United States
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 19^7), pp. 127-128.

3i)lbid., p. 101.
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Not one of the first fifteen Legislative Assemblies had a total
membership in both houses larger than thirty-nine members.

The

largest number of members the Council had, until the sixteenth session
of 1885. was thirteen, and the greatest number of members in the House
of Representatives, for the same period of time, was twenty-six.3-5
However, even increasing the Council to twenty-four and the House to
forty-eight, as Congress provided in 188^, did not reduce the number
of legislature overrides of governor's vetoes or the attempts to
override.
At the time of the Bismarck Tribune's complaint, the fourteenth
legislature of 1881 had overridden twelve of the governor's vetoes.3°
In I885 there was one veto overridden by the legislature.3?

The

following session in 1887 found the Assembly overriding two of the
governor's vetoes.3®

The eighteenth and final session of the legis

lature in 1839 overrode twenty vetoes of Governor Lewis K. Church.39
For the legislative sessions from 1881 through 1889, there were a
total of 925 general, special and private laws that passed both houses

hjQ
of the legislature.

The executive did not sign eighty-seven of

these bills when presented to him, during the session, and these bills

-^Frank H. Hagerty, Territory of Dakota (Aberdeen: Daily News
Print, 1819), pp. 13-22.
3^Territory of Dakota, Session Laws, 1881.
^Territory of Dakota, Session Laws, 1885, PP* 26-2?.
3®Territory of Dakota, Session Laws, 1887.
39Territory of Dakota, Session Laws, 1889•
^Hagerty, pp. 13-22.
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became law.

For the same time period, the Legislative Assembly over-

rode thirty-five of the executive vetoes.

41

The subject material of the governor's vetoes in the Dakota
Territorial period covers a number of topics.

Governors Jayne and

Edmunds vetoed bills granting divorces to specific women in the
territory.

Until 1866 the legislature granted individual divorces

by passing individual bills.
bills sent to him.

l\,o

Governor Edmunds vetoed all divorce

It was the Governor's belief that the granting

of divorces should be the function of the territorial courts, not the
legislature.^3
territories.

In 1866 Congress amended the Organic lav; of all the
This was done to prohibit the pernicious legislation

which had characterized the enactments of some of the territorial
legislatures.^

A part of this amended law prohibited the legislatures

from granting divorces, leaving that authority to the courts of the
territories.^

This action had been recommended by Governor Edmunds

in his veto messages of the divorce bills.^
Governor John L. Pennington had an unusual experience over
his use of the veto.

Pennington vetoed a bond bill for grasshopper

relief only to have the legislature override the veto.

The legislature,

after overriding the veto, made no attempt to set the law into

^Compiled from the Session Laws of the 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th
and 18th Legislative Assemblies of the Territory of Dakota.
^2Kingsbury, p. 459•
^3ibid., p. 428.
^ I b i d .. p. 459.
45ibid.

^Ibid., p. 428.

operation.

The Governor then appealed to the citizens for help to

provide money for grasshopper relief.

Pennington admitted that he

had erred in his estimate of the misfortune. ?
Pennington was also placed in a situation that some later
governors of the State of.North Dakota would be also placed in.

This

situation occurs when legislation is sent to the governor for approval
or disapproval at the end of the session and he doesn't have the time
to fully read all the bills placed before him.

Pennington failed to

veto a bill that he did not have time to read except by title and the
title was misleading as to the contents of the bill.

When it was

discovered what the law would do, the Governor went to Washington and
talked with the territorial delegate asking his help.

Delegate Kidder

was able to convince the Congress to rule out the objectionable part
of the law.48
Governor Nehemiah G. Ordway lost a veto to the legislature’s
two-thirds majority when he vetoed a bill for extra pay for the judge
of the First Judicial District.

The Governor had the weight of an

opinion by the United States Attorney-General on his side, but the
Attorney-General did not base his opinion on the illegality of the
bill, only that it was not desirable.

The fourteenth legislature

of the Dakota Territory had many good lawyers and the bill was passed
over Ordway*s veto, regardless of the United States Attorney-General’s
opinion.4^

Ordway was also thought to be using his veto message to

4?Ibid., pp. 846-847.
48Ibid., pp. 836-840.
^Kingsbury, Vol. II, pp. 1172-1173.
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strengthen himself in Washington rather than secure the favor of the
territorial legislature.-'’®
Governor Gilbert A. Pierce ran into opposition of a number of
factions over his use of the veto.

Pierce vetoed a bill giving women

above the age of twenty-one the right to vote.

The legislature failed

to override his veto, partly because of his reasons for vetoing the
bill.

The Governor found enough defects in the framing of the bill

to condemn it and he was of the opinion that the law would delay claim
to statehood.

Pierce also doubted that women wanted the franchise

or that the sentiment of the territory favored it.-^"

Pierce didn't

escape the indignation of some women over his veto of this bill.
Pierce was denounced by Kate Stoneman of Albany.

She sent a request

to President Cleveland that Pierce be summarily removed from off ice.-52
Cleveland didn't follow her request to remove Pierce, as Pierce
continued in office until he resigned in 1837.
Pierce also vetoed a bill to change the name of the town of
Ordway to Independence.

One historian stated that the Governor had

apparently come to the conclusion that it was the duty of governors
to stand by one another.-53

a

bill to move the capitol from Bismarck

to Pierre was also vetoed by Pierce.
Governor Louis K. Church ran into political opposition from

5°Ibid., p. 1173.
5-*~Ibid., p. 1401.

Text of veto message, see p. 1402.

52tfaldo, p. 292.
^Kingsbury, p. 1397-^Ibid., see veto message p.

1397*
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two political parties over his use of the veto.

At the Republican

Territorial Convention, to elect delegates to the Republican National
Convention, held at Jamestown in May 1888, an address to the people
of the United States was presented for approval.

In this address the

Governor's use of the veto was attacked:
He has wielded his executive club over the Legislature
by threatening to veto certain bills, and promising to approve
bills with jobs in them.55
Not only did the Republicans attack Democratic Governor Church
but his own political party also attacked him.

At the territorial

Democratic Convention at Watertown in May 1889, there was a great deal
of anti-Church feeling.

This feeling went so far as to call for

Church's impeachment.-^

A part of the statement calling for Church's

impeachment, as presented by Mr. Brierly of Grand Forks County, is
almost identical with the Republican statement.

Mr. Brierly states

in part:
He has wielded his executive club over the Legislature,
threatening with his veto measures that did not conform to
his ideas of propriety, and promising his approval on bills
with jobs in them for his special friends as well as himself
Governor Church was not impeached nor did the threats or
political warfare hinder his veto.

The Bismarck Tribune of March 10,

1889, criticizes the lavish use of the veto by Church to prevent
forty-three more laws from taking effect.^®*
5

5-5lbid., p.

1517 .

5 6Ibid., p.

1521 for statement on impeachment.

57Ibid.
5®Lamar, p. 278.
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Governor Church's attitude and his. method on the use of the
veto was described by Senator Thomas J. Walsh in a letter.

Walsh wrote:

Church is not a name to conjure with in this neighborhood
or in any other. Nine members of the council besought him to
sign the bill or return it with his reasons but he coolly dropped
it into the waste basket and told them he had no time to write
veto messages. He assumed a most dictatorial authority over
legislation and never a Roman senate was more obsequious to
emperor than that chosen from our remarkably independent
people to their little Caesar.59
Governor Church may have contributed to securing a new weapon
in the veto power of the future governors of the State of North Dakota
when he commented on the desirability of allowing the governor to veto
items in bills.

Church, in his messages to the Secretary of the

Interior, expressed the desirability of allowing the governor to
veto items in bills, a power the territorial governors of Dakota did
not have.

In Church's message to the Secretary in 1887, he stated:

It would have been well had the same act clothed the
governors with power to veto items in the appropriation bills
and thereby prevent the loading down of needful and proper
bills of appropriation with what is often not only unnecessary
but extravagant.00
One year later, in his message to the Secretary of the Interior, he
commented on the item veto:
The matter of providing for the maintenance of our various
Territorial institutions and officers and general expenses of
the Territorial government and the passage at times of excessive
or unnecessary appropriations and the habit of tacking on
proper appropriations unnecessary and expensive items, commonly

•59j. Leonard Bates (ed.), Tom Walsh in Dakota Territory,
Personal Correspondence of Senator Thomas J. Walsh and Eleanor C.
KcCl'em'ent (Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1966). p. 119.
^°Report of the Governor of Dakota to the Secretary of the
Interior 1887 (Washington: Government Press), p. 47.
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called riders, suggests the propriety of the passage by Congress
of such laws as would enable the governor to veto items of
appropriations in bills, and approving such as are unobjection
able.
Congress did not enact the legislation desired by Church, either for
the territories or for the Federal Government.

When North Dakota

became a State, one year later, the item veto was included in the
State Constitution as a part of the governor's veto power over
legislation.
The gubernatorial veto power in the Dakota Territory was both
weakened and strengthened because of its use or misuse by the governors*
The actions of the territorial governors as well as the territorial
legislatures, would certainly be remembered when statehood was planned
by the founding fathers of North Dakota.

^-Report of the Governor of Dakota to the Secretary of the
Interior 1888 (Washington: Government Press), p. 55*

CHAPTER II

VETO AS EXERCISED BY NORTH DAKOTA GOVERNORS TO 1961

By the time North Dakota's Constitution was written, it was
taken for granted that the governor should have the veto power.

The

Constitutional Convention did not lack for information when it created
the North Dakota Constitution.
represented.

Many of the state constitutions were

The delegates were all supplied with copies of the

constitution of South Dakota, wThich had already been adopted by the
popular vote of that proposed state.^

The Committee on the Executive

Department, which was responsible for developing the veto power of the
governor, reported their recommendations to the convention.

The

committee's report in part was as follows:
Section 9» Every bill which shall have passed the Legis
lature, shall before it becomes a law, be presented to the
Governor. If he approve, he shall sign, but if not he shall
return it with his objections to the house in which it originated,
which shall enter the objection at large upon the Journal and
proceed to reconsider it. If after such reconsideration twothirds of the members present shall agree to pass the bill,
it shall be sent, together with the objection, to the other
house, by which it-shall likewise be reconsidered, and if it
be approved by two-thirds of the members present, it shall be
come a law; but in all such cases the vote of both houses shall
be determined by yeas and nays, and the names of the members
voting for and against the bill shall be entered upon the
Journal of each house respectively. If any bill shall not
be returned by the Governor within three days (Sundays
excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the
same shall be a law, unless the Legislature shall by its

•1
-Kingsbury, p.

1927.
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adjournment present its return, in which case it shall be
filed with his objections in the office of the Secretary of
State, within fifteen days after such adjournment, or become
a law.
Section 10. The Governor shall have the power to dis
approve on any item or items or part or parts of any bill
making appropriations of money or property embracing distinct
items and part or parts of the bill approved shall be law,
and the item or items and part or parts disapproved shall be
void, unless enacted in the following manner: If the Legis
lature be in session he shall transmit to the house in which
the bill originated a copy of the item or items or part or
parts thereof disapproved, together with his objection thereto,
and the items or parts objected to shall be separately reconsid
ered, and each item or part shall then take the same course as
is prescribed for the passage of bills over the executive
veto.^
Section nine would allow the governor time after adjournment
of the legislature to consider bills.

This was something that the

territorial governors were not granted.

One other change from the

territorial governor's veto power, included in Section nine, was the
removal of the pocket veto.

If he did not sign the bills in the time

alioted after adjournment, the bills became law.

Under territorial

government, all legislation ended at the time of final adjournment
of the Legislative Assembly.
Section ten, if accepted by the convention, vrauld create the
item veto for the governor.

This was the type of veto power that

Territorial Governor Church had requested from the Congress.

The

wording of this proposal appears to be very clear as tc what the
governor can do with the item veto.

But governors would interpret

the meaning differently, as will be noted later.
The Committee of the Whole recommended that Sections nine and

^Journal of the Constitutional Convention for North Dakota
Tribune (Bismarck: State Printers and Binders, 1839)7 ppV 133-13^•
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ten be adopted by the convention.

3

Very little debate was carried on

in the convention over the veto power of the governor.

Mr. Killer

moved to strike out the word "present" and insert the word "elected"
wherever it occurred in that section as used in that sense.^
was adopted.

This

This change in Section nine would make the veto a little

more difficult to override than it was in the territorial government.
Formerly, a two-thirds vote of the members present was necessary for
the legislature to override a veto.

The change would require a

definite number of the elected membership of each house to pass over
the governor's veto.
There was little additional change from the report of the
Committee on the Executive Department and the article was adopted by
the convention.

There are four sections in the North Dakota

Constitution containing provisions on the gubernatorial veto power.
Section twenty-five denies the governor veto power over measures
initiated by or referred to the electors.

Section seventy-nine

details the veto procedure and the manner of the legislature over
riding the governor's veto.

Section eighty contains the item veto

power and the method for overriding this type of veto.

Section

eighty-one places limitations on certain actions of the governor.
Included in this section is the possible punishment of a governor
if he threatens a member of the legislature by the possible use of
his veto power.^

^Ibid., p. 12?.
^Tbid., p. 282.
•^North Dakota, Constitution.
sections on governor veto power.

See Appendix A for conplete
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Since the adoption of the Executive Article in the North
Dakota Constitution, in 1889, the original section on the governor's
veto power has not been changed or altered by constitutional amend
ment.

The last attempt to change the veto power of the governor

occurred in 1966.

A proposed constitutional amendment to allow the

governor to reduce items in appropriation bills was defeated by the
voters by 69,116 to 84,131 votes.^

Governor William Langer, during

his terms as chief executive, did reduce or pare items in appropriation
bills.

No legal action was taken to challenge his reduction of various

items and the reductions remained in effect.
North Dakota has been classified as a state having a strong
executive veto.

This classification is because of allowing the

governor ten or more days for consideration of bills after adjournment,
requiring two-thirds of the elected members to override a veto, and
7
allowing the governor to veto items in appropriation bills.

In

North Dakota every bill passed by both houses of the Legislative
Assembly must be presented to the governor for his approval or
rejection.

If during the session the governor disapproves a bill,

he is constitutionally obligated to return it to the house where it
originated accompanied by a veto message stating his objections.

If

the legislature is not in session, the governor must file the veto
with the Secretary of State.

A veto during the session may be over

ridden by a two-thirds vote of the elected members of each house.
During the legislative session the governor has three days, not

% o r t h Dakota, Session Laws, 1967, p. 1226.
?For the entire criteria for judging the relative strength of
the veto in each state, see Prescott, p. 100.
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counting Sundays, in which to act on the bill.

After adjournment of

the Legislative Assembly the period for consideration is extended to
fifteen days Sundays being counted.

In either case, if the governor

does not sign or veto the bill, it becomes a law as though the
governor had signed it.

Unlike the President of the United States,
O
the governor of North Dakota does not possess the pocket veto.
North Dakota governors do not have the veto power over all
forms of legislation.

The state constitution prohibits the exercise

of the veto over any initiative or referendum measures.^
The governor of North Dakota also has the veto power over
actions of the State Industrial Commission.
him by the legislature in 1919*

This power was given

House Bill 17 was an act to create

the State Industrial Commission and the veto power was included in
the a c t . ^

This law was referred to the voters on June 26, 1919»

for their approval or rejection.

The voters gave their approval to

House Bill 17 by a vote of 61,188 yes as opposed to 50,271 no votes.^
The wording of the governor's veto power, in the bill, seemingly
indicated that the governor had an absolute veto over the actions of
the Commission.
Q

The procedure, for overriding a veto in North Dakota is
similar in one respect to the national practice. The North Dakota
Constitution requires the house of origin to reconsider the governor's
veto as does the national government.
^North Dakota, Session Laws, 1919. pp. 503-50^* In 1918 North
Dakota adopted, by Constitutional Amendment, the initiative and
referendum. The veto power of the Governor was not extended to the
measures initiated by or referred to the Electors.
10Ibid., pp. 215-218.

^ T b id ., p. 509 •
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In 1928, a North Dakota State Supreme Court ruling was
rendered which limited the governor's veto power over the Industrial
Commission.

This action was the result of a court case brought by

the Secretary of the Industrial Commission for his salary of the month
of July, 1927.
During the legislative sessions of 1927, the governor had
vetoed an item in the appropriation bill for the Industrial Commission.

. ,

The item vetoed out was the salary of the Secretary, $5 >600.
Secretary Gammon

brought suit to recover his salary.

12

The case

eventually reached the State Supreme Court and the Court reached its
decision in the case State ex rel. Gammon, Secretary of State
Industrial Commission, v. Sorlie et al., State Auditing Board, on
April 9, 1928.
The court ruled that the governor did not have the absolute
veto power to disallow all bills for administrative expenses of the
Commission.

13

The court also ruled that the governor was not given

the power to disallow the ordinary bills of the Industrial Commission
IZJ.
incurred in the regular and usual conduct of its affairs.

According

to the Supreme Court, the governor did not have an absolute veto over
the Industrial Commission.
During the twenty-third session of the legislature, 1933»
Senate Bill 195 was passed into law.

This law amended, re-enacted and

construed the previous laws relating to the State Industrial Commission.

•*~%orth Western Reporter, Vol. 219 (St. Paul: West Publishing
Co., 1928), p. 106.
^ Ibid.. p.

105 .

lZjTpid.. p. 110.
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Part of the law established an absolute veto, for the governor, over
actions of the Commission.

Under the law, not even the courts could

question the governor's power.

Section 3°8a^ reads in part:

All orders, rules, regulations, by-laws and written
contracts, adopted or authorized by the Commission shall,
before becoming effective, be approved by the Governor, as
Chairman, and shall not be in force unless approved and signed
by him. In the creation of the Industrial Commission, it was
the intention of the Legislature, and it is the intention of
this Legislature, that the Governor shall have full veto power
and that any Act vetoed, or not approved and signed, by him,
shall be null and void and of no effect. Any decision of any
court to the contrary, notwithstanding.
The fortieth session of the State Legislative Assembly found
the House twice trying to remove the veto power over the Commission.
On the first attempt the failure of the constitutional majority
resulted in the bill being indefinitely postponed.^
House considered House Bill 799 and passed the bill

A week later the
by a vote of

seventy to twenty-two, six members not voting, and sent it to the
Senate.^

The Senate acted on the advice of the Committee, to which

the bill had been referred, and indefinitely postponed action.

18

There being no further Senate action on this bill, the bill did not
become law.
The extent of the use of the gubernatorial veto by the
governors of North Dakota is shown in Table 1 on the following page.
The total figure of 523 vetoes includes all types of vetoes as
exercised by the governors of North Dakota.

The total includes the

"'■-’North Dakota, Session Laws, 1933. p. 299*
■'’ House Journal, 196?, p. 507*
17Ibid., p. 676.
^Senate Journal, 1967. p. 828.
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TABLE 1
INDIVIDUAL GUBERNATORIAL VETOES 1839-196?

Governor and His
Political Party

Legislative
Assembly
No. of
No. of
Regular and
Full
Item Total
Vetoes
Special Sessions Vetoes Vetoes Vetoes Overridden

John Miller, R
Andrew H. Burke, R
Eli C. D. Shortridge, D
Roger Allin. R
Frank A. Briggs, R
Joseph M. Devine, R
Frederick B. Fancher, R
Frank V,Elite, R
E. Y..Sarles, R
John Burke, D
L. B. Hanna, R
Iynn J. Frazier, R
R. A. Nestos, R.
A. G. Sorlie, R
Walter Haddock, R
George F. Schafer, R
William Langer, R
Ole H. Olson, R
Thos H. Hoodie, D
Walter Welford, R
John Moses, D
Fred Aandahl, R
Norman Brunsdale, R
John E. Davis, R
William L. Guy, D
Total

1
2
1
1
1
0
1
2
13
2
5
1
3
0
2
3
0
0
1
4
3
3
2
5
^7

13
3
17
22
2
0
0
13
15
32
31
20
11
24
0
16
42
0
0
12
18
10
8
4
49

2
0
1
8
10
0
0
5
9
18
14
11
18
2
0
2
49
0
0
4
2
1
1
0
4

362

161

aVetoed a $25 concurrent resolution.
^Vetoed concurrent resolution.
Sources:

0
18
91
0
0
16
20
11
9
4
53

1
0
0
0
10
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
7

523

19

15
3
18
30
12
0
0
18
24
50a
^5
31b
29
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See footnote 44.

See footnote 45.

Regular and Special Session Laws IS9O-I967.
House and Senate Journals 1889-196?.
Bismarck Tribune.

Fargo Argus.
Fargo Forum.
Fargo Forum and Daily Republican.
Grand Forks Herald.
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vetoes that were successful, those overridden by the legislature and
vetoes that were recalled by the legislature and changed to meet the
objections.

Two concurrent resolutions, that were vetoed, are included

in the totals.
Of the twenty-one governors that had the opportunity to veto
bills passed by the Legislative Assemblies of North Dakota, only one
governor didn’t use this power to check the legislature.

Governor

Frederick B. Fancher, in the session of IB99 , did not issue one veto
message.^9

There have been forty regular sessions of the North Dakota

Legislative Assembly, and in only three sessions did the governors
find it unnecessary to veto legislation.

Besides Fancher, Governor

Norman Brunsdale, in one session, and Governor John Davis, in one
session, appeared to be in harmony with the legislature and did not
use the veto power once.

In the seven special sessions of the

legislature, that have been called, the governor's veto has been used
in three of the sessions.
As indicated in Table 1, Governor William L. Guy has exercised
the greatest number of full vetoes of any governor, forty-nine.
Governor William Langer used the item veto the greatest number of
times, also forty-nine.

The record holder for the total number of

vetoes, full and item,'is also Governor Langer.

During his tenure

in the governors1 office, Langer vetoed ninety-one bills passed hy
the legislature.
Table 2 on the following page shows a breakdown of the vetoes
in ten year periods.

The greatest exercise of the veto power was in

■^Governors Devine, Maddock, Olson and Moodie did not use the
veto as there was no legislative session.
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TABLE 2
NORTH DAKOTA GOVERNOR VETOES BY TEN YEAR PERIODS

Vetoes
During
Session

Years

Vetoes
.After
Session

Vetoes
Over
ridden

Total
Vetoes

78
72
92
70
121
24
13
53
523

1889-1900
1901-1910
1911-1920
1921-1930
1931-194)
1941-1950
1951-1960
1961-1967

20
5
2
8
22
4
2
15

53
67
90
99
20
11
38

11
0
0
0
0
1
0
7

Totals

78

445

19

Sources:

62

Regular and Special Session Laws 1890-1967*
House and Senate Journals 1869-1967.
Bismarck Tribune.Fargo Argus.

Fargo Forum.
Fargo Forum and Daily Republican.
Grand Forks Herald.

the years 1931-1943 when 121 vetoes were issued.

It is significant to

note in Table 2 the number of vetoes that were exercised after the
legislature had adjourned as compared to the number of vetoes before
adjournment.

This factor had a great influence upon the number of

vetoes that were overridden.
As Table 2 indicates, there have been more vetoes used after
rather than during, the legislative sessions in North Dakota.

This

is due, in part, to the legislature submitting a great number of
bills to the governor during the final three days of the sessions.
By sending legislation to the governor in the last three days of the
session, the legislature is almost unable to override a governor’s
veto.

Since the governor has fifteen days after adjournment to veto
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a bill, the legislature by sending so many measures to the executive
in the final three days removes the opportunity to override a veto.
One other reason for few vetoes issued before adjournment, has been
the political party relationship between the executive branch and
the legislative branch.

Of the twenty-five men who have held the

office of governor, only five have been Democrats.

Only once have

the Democrats controlled one house of the legislature, that being
in 1965 when the House of Representatives was controlled by the
Democratic Party.2x

It is significant to note that in this session

of the legislature, Governor Guy exercised his veto power the fewest
number of times.
The gubernatorial veto in North Dakota has not been in
exclusive control of one political party.

Both Democratic and

Republican governors have exercised the gubernatorial veto to varying
degrees.

Table 3 on the following page breaks the veto into use by

political party.

The Republican governors have vetoed 382 bills

as compared to 141 vetoes for the four Democratic governors.

Table

3 also indicates the number of vetoes by party before and after
adjournment.
ridden.

The Republicans also have had the most vetoes over

A total breakdown by party governors is found in Tables

4A and 43 on the following pages.

^North Dakota, Blue Book, I96I, p. 130.
^-Grand Forks Herald, January 1, 1967. p. 6.
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TABLE 3
COMBINED DEMOCRAT AND REPUBLICAN GOVERNORS VETOES

No. of Governors
Exercising Veto

Before

After

Total

Overrode

No. of
Sessions

17

55

327

382

12

34

Democrats

4

23

118

141

7

13

Total

21

78

445

523

19

47

Republicans

Sources:

Regular and Special Session Laws I89O-I967.
House and Senate Journals 1839-1967.
Bismarck Tribune.
Fargo Argus.
Fargo Forum.
Fargo Forum and Daily Republican.
Grand Forks Herald.

TABLE 4A
DEMOCRATIC GUBERNATORIAL VETOES

Democrats

Before

Guy
Moses
Moodie
J . Burke
Shortridge

15
2
0
4
2

38
18

Total

23

118

Sources:

After

Total

53
20

Overrode

7
0

Regular and
Special Sessions

• •

• •

46
is-

50
18

0
0

5
4
0
3
1

141

7

13

• •

Regular and Special Session laws I89O-I967.
House and Senate Journals 1889-1967•
Bismarck Tribune.
Fargo Argus.
Fargo Forum.
Fargo Forun and Daily Republican.
Grand Forks Herald.

Democrats
Control
House

1
0
• •
0
0
1
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TABLE 4B
REPUBLICAN GUBERNATORIAL VETOES

Republicans

Regular and
3efore After Total Overrode Special Sessions

15
9
8
3

0
18
91
0
16
11
9
4

1
0
0
10
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0

1
2
1
1
0
1
2
1
2
5
1
3
0
2
3
0
1
3
3
2

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

327

382

12

34

0

Miller
A. Burke
Allin
Briggs
Devine
Fancher
White
Sarles
Hanna
Frazier
Nestos
Sorlie
Maddock
Schafer
Langer
Olson
Welford
Aandahl
3runsdale
Davis

5
0
3
10
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
7
0
1
21
0
1
2
1
1

10
3
27
2
0
0
17
24
44
30
29
19

15
3
30
12
0
0
18
24
45
31
29

• •

Total

55

Sources:

No. of Houses
Controlled by
Democrats

17
70
• •
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Regular and Special Session Laws 1890-1967*
House and Senate Journals 1889-1967»
Bismarck Tribune.
Fargo Argus.
Fargo Forum.
Fargo Forum and Daily Republican.
Grand ForksHerald.

The use of the gubernatorial veto in North Dakota has been
successful in relation to the number of vetoes overridden by the twothirds majority of the elective members of the North Dakota Legislature.
As was previously stated, only four governors have experienced their
vetoes being overruled by the legislature.
first to have a veto overridden.

Governor Miller was the

His veto for the creation and
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support of the Deaf and Dumb School was overruled.

22

Governor Frank

Briggs was the next governor to feel the sting of the legislature’s
action.

Briggs vetoed ten appropriation bills and had the displeasure

of having all ten bills overridden.

In his message to the Senate,

Briggs listed several reasons for his action.

One of his complaints

is today still a complaint of most governors who receive legislation
late in the session.

Briggs’ message clearly shows the problem:

I regret the fact that these measures cannot receive my
approval, but the reasons to me are so apparent that my
duties seem plain.
If there is any legislation that should receive careful
and painstaking consideration it is certainly that of provid
ing for the maintenance of our public institutions. Ample
time should be given committees to discuss and pass upon
appropriation bills, and if this be true of committees it
would appear that the executive ought to be accorded the
courtesy of a reasonable time to consider these matters.
In the present instance these bills come to the executive
eight hours prior to the final adjournment of your honorable
body. It certainly will not be contended that this is
sufficient time to give to such important legislation.
The total amount appropriated in the bills herewith
returned without my approval in my opinion is largely in
excess of the expected revenue. Careful estimates have been
made by the state auditor and state treasurer as to the prob
able income for the biennial period under the present laws,
and to this has been added a liberal allowance for revenue
contemplated under pending legislation. Yet, the fact remains
that there will be insufficient funds to meet these appropria
tion bills. Assuming liabilities in excess of possible receipts
is not a good business proposition, and I do not believe that
a single member of your honorable body would consider it so
were the same conditions applied to his own affairs.^3
The legislature didn't concur with Briggs' message and by their action
overrode all ten appropriation vetoes.
Governor William Guy faced a similar problem in the 1967
session of the Fortieth Legislative Assembly.

22Senate Journal, 1889, p. 902.

In Guy's veto of the*
2

House Journal, 1889, p. 1^21.

2^Senate Journal, 1897, pp. 618-619.

33
three-fourths percent sales tax increase, he states that the bill was
conceived late in the session and, "delivered on ny desk hi hours
later, wet, dripping and struggling."22
^

Guy also experienced having

his veto overridden by the legislature.

In fact, of the ten vetoes

of Governor Guy before adjournment seven were overridden.
The only other governor besides the aforementioned to have a
veto overridden was Fred Aandahl in 19^5*

Aandahl vetoed a bill

giving additional expense money to the legislators only to have the
legislature override the veto the day after the Governor’s message
was read in both houses.2^
A good measure of the governor's influence is the relatively
small number of gubernatorial vetoes that have been overridden.

In

all but four of the regular and special sessions of the North Dakota
Legislature, the veto was absolute.

This fact may be due to the

constitutional limitations, to the legislature sending much of the
legislation to the governor in the final days of the session and to
the political relationship between the executive office and the two
houses of the Legislative Assembly.

The greatest number of full

vetoes overridden occurred when the governor was a Democrat and the
two houses of the legislature were overwhelmingly Republican controlled.
In most states',''early governors used the veto sparingly to
protect themselves from what they considered to be an unconstitutional
enroachment on their authority by the legislature.

It was also used

to thwart what was thought to be unconstitutional legislative bills.

2^Grand Forks Herald, February 28, 1967, p. 1.
23Grand Forks Herald, February 20, 19^5, P* !•
2%orey, p. 3h
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Governor John Miller, first Governor of North Dakota, vetoed five
bills on the grounds the bills were unconstitutional.
Table 5 lists eight reasons for gubernatorial vetoes in
North Dakota.

The most common reason listed in the veto messages

were in the interests of economy.

The most common statement found

is "appropriations exceed revenue."
into this category.

Most of the item vetoes fall

The second reason for governors vetoing legis

lation was in the public interest or unsound public policy.

Frank

Prescott, in his nationwide study of reasons given by governors for
using the veto, found this reason to be the most common.

27

Remove

the item vetoes from the reasons given by North Dakota governors, for
use of the veto, and Prescott’s most common reason would also apply
in North Dakota.

In some of the veto messages, more than one reason

for the veto was given by the governor.

What is listed in Table 5

is what this researcher considered the major reason for the governor’s
vetoes.
Table 6 breaks down the reasons for vetoes by a ten year
period.

This chart indicates a desire for economy during the

depression years.
The item veto originated in Georgia during the period of the
Southern Confederacy.

28

Forty-one states provide for an executive

veto of items in appropriation bills.

29

Originally the device was*
2

^Prescott, p. 109.
2®Morey, p. 41.
^ Book of the States 1964-65, pp. 58-59*

35
TABLE 5
GOVERNORS' REASONS FOR VETOING BILLS
Item
1

Governor

Miller
A. Burke
Shortridge
Allin
Briggs
Fancher
White
Sarles
J. Burke
Hanna
Frazier
Nestos
Sorlie
Shafer
Welford
Langer
Moses
Aandahl
Brunsdale
Davis
Guy
Totals

Item
2

Item
3

2
0
2
10
10
0
9
16
29
28
17
23
7
3
6
61
5
3
2
1
10

11
9
3
18
7
6
2
3
35

2
1
0
0
0
8
1
3
0
1
1
0
0
5
2
1
0
1

2k4

135

36

3
1
1
3
0
0
2
7
8
9
3

5
1

k

k

Item

k
1
1
2
8
0
0
0
0

•3
0

k
1
0
0
0
2
1
0
1
0
0
2k

Item
5

Item
6

Item
7

k

0
0
5
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
2

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
5
1
1
0
0
6
0
0
0
0
0
1

31

13

14

0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
7
3
1
9
0
0
2
0

Item
8

Total

k

••
k
6
1
0
5
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
1
0
0

26

15
3
18
30
12
0
18
2k
50
45
31
29

26
18
16
91
20
11
9
4
53
523

Notes:

Item
Itea
Item
Item
Item
Item
certified.
Item
Item

1
2
3
4
5
6

refers
refers
refers
refers
refers
refers

to
to
to
to
to
to

economy or tax burden.
public interest or unsound public policy,
unconstitutional or unlawful,
duplication or conflicts with present law.
unnecessary.
defective drafting, clarity or not properly

7 refers to poor law or present law best,
8 refers to miscellaneous or reasons unknown.

The classification scheme for this table is based upon that
used by Prescott, p. 109.
Sources: Governors' Messages from Journals of House and Senate.
Bismarck Tribune.

Fargo Argus.
Fargo Forum.
Fargo Forum and Daily Republican.
Grand Forks Herald.
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TABLE 6
REASONS FOR VETOES BY TEN YEAR PERIODS

Years

Item
6

Item
8

Total

1
0
2

0
0
6
1
6
0
0
1

15
6
1
1
1
1
1
0

78
72
92
70
121
24
13
53

13

14

26

523

Item
1

Item
2

Item
3

Item
4

Item
5

24
43
54
35
72
3
3
10

8
14
15
19
28
11
5
35

13
4
8
2
0
7
1
1

12
71
6
1
2
1
1
0

0
3
2
8
12
0
2
4

6
1
0
3

244

135

36

24

31

1889-1900
1901-1910
1911-1920
1921-1930
1931-1940
1941-1950
1951-1960
1961-1967
Totals

0

Item
7

Notes:
Item
Item
Item
Item
Item
Item
certified.
Item
Item

1
2
3
4
5
6

refers
refers
refers
refers
refers
refers

to
to
to
to
to
to

the economy or tax burden.
the public interest or unsound public policy,
unconstitutional or unlawful,
duplication or conflicts with present law.
unnecessary.
defective drafting, clarity or not properly

7 refers to poor law or present law best,
8 refers to miscellaneous or reasons unknown.

The classification scheme for this table is based upon that
used by Prescott, p. 109•
Sources:

Governors' Messages from Journals of House and Senate.
Bismarck Tribune.
Fargo Argus.
Fargo Forum.
Fargo Forum and Daily Republican.
Grand Forks Herald.

adopted to check improper or unconstitutional grants of money according
to Prescott.

30

The item veto has been a part of the veto power of North Dakota

^Oprescott, p. 106
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governors since the state’s beginning.

Some of the governors have used

the power sparingly or not at all, while others wielded the 'knife*
to a great extent.

"In itself," says Negley, "this did not constitute

a major concession. . . .but significance lies in the fact that this
provision provided the one additional power necessary to make the
veto a potential 'stick' in the hands of any governor inclined to
use it."3^

Except for Governor Briggs, the item veto has been a

potential 'stick* in the hands of North Dakota governors.
Table 7 on the following page shows the number of item vetoes
by governors and the amount of appropriations itemed out of the bills.
Note should be made of the amount of money removed from the appropria
tion bills by Governor Langer, as he pared or reduced the amounts of
money as well as itemed out parts of the bill.

Earlier governors had

desired to do this, but did not think it was constitutional.

Governor

R. A. Nestos in explanation of an item veto said in part:
Unfortunately the executive is limited in his vetoes by
the requirement that each item must either be disallowed in
full or permitted to stand, even though considered excessive.
This situation makes it doubly difficult to make reductions
without injury to the institutions affected.-'2
Governor Langer was of the opinion that he had the authority
to reduce or pare items in appropriation bills and stated that he
intended to use this power: to reduce state taxes to a point where
the taxpayers could afford to pay the expense of operating the
state government.

33

The Herald reported that Langer said the

-^Glenn R. Negley, "The Executive Veto in Illinois," American
Political Science Review, XXXIII (December, 1939), p. 1052.
^^Grand Forks Herald, March 11, 1923, p. 1.
^ Grand Forks Herald. March 12, 1933» P« !•
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TABLE 7
ITEM VETOES AND AMOUNT REMOVED

No. of
Item Vetoes

Governor

Miller
Shortridge
Allin
Briggs
White
Sarles
J. Burke
Hanna
Frazier
Nestos
Sorlie
Schafer
Langer
Welford
Moses
Aandahl
Brunsdale
Guy
Totals

2
1
8
10
5
9
18
14

Amount Cut
or Reduced

$

8,700
5,000
121,340
322,175a

28,800
120,266

18

128,625
193.625
801,563
338,965

2
2

191,900
102,000

11

49
4

2
1
1
4

161

685,728.69°
38,840

10,700
2 ,500,000
180,900
265,000
$6,044,127.69

aAll money restored by legislature overriding item vetoes.
^Langer reduced or pared items in appropriation bills.
Sources;

Regular and Special Session Laws 1890-1967.
House and Senate Journals 1889-1967*
Bismarck Tribune.
Fargo Argus.
Fargo Forum.
Fargo Forum and Daily Republican.
Grand Forks Herald.

Attorney-General had ruled that the governor had authority to reduce
items in appropriation bills and veto single items in any bill.

34

The Attorney-General's ruling was not recorded in the newspaper story.

34Ibid.. March 19, 1933, P* 1
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The only ruling relating to the veto power, during this tine period,
was if the governor had the power to veto an emergency clause of a
legislative act without vetoing the body of the act.

In discussing

the question it was taken for granted that the act in question was
not an appropriation bill.

The Attorney-General ruled the governor
35

could not veto an emergency clause.
In 1935 P» 0. Sathre, the new Attorney-General issued an
opinion that governors could not ’scale down' items of appropriation
measures.

In the ruling Sathre was of the opinion:

That under Section 80 of our Constitution the Governor
may veto in toto, any or all of the items of an appropriation
bill, but he may not reduce or scale down or in any manner
change, except by elimination of a whole item, any of the
items of such appropriation.
Ten years later, after Langer’s action, Governor John Hoses
said he was without power to pare items, but could veto entire items.
Moses referred to Langer’s action by relating that Langer had a
friendly administration in all state departments and there was little
chance that his action would be challenged in court; it was not
challenged.

Hoses referred to his own administration by saying

". . .unfortunately the present governor does not have such friendly
co-operation in all state departments and any such action on his part
35
•^Report of the Attorney General of North Dakota to the
Governor July 1, 1932 to June 30, 1934. (Bismarck), pp. 143-144.
This writer could not find a specific ruling that allowed the governor
to reduce items in appropriation bills. The ruling stated in the text
could be the ruling to which Langer referred. This ruling was made on
March 9. 1933*
^ Report of the Attorney General of North Dakota to the
Governor July 1, 1934 to June 30. 1936. (Bismarck), pp. 5-7*
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would undoubtedly be challenged at the first opportunity. . .".37
Governor Moses was a Democrat faced with a Republican controlled
legislature and most of the executive offices also were filled with
Republicans.
The States of Pennsylvania, California and Massachusetts have
given the governor the power to reduce items in appropriation bills
as well as reject them.3®

To allow North Dakota governors this

additional power would require a constitutional amendment approved
by the voters.

One such attempt was made in 1966, but the amendment

lost.
Of the 161 item vetoes, all but two have involved a sum of
money.

Governor Guy in 1967 vetoed two bills that would transfer

funds between line items.
removed from the bills.

No definite sum of money was involved or
No one has challenged these vetoes on the

grounds of constitutionality.

One person interviewed at the Capitol

building was of the opinion that the vetoes were illegal.

However,

he pointed out that the only persons involved in the matter were
appointees of Governor Guy.

He ventured the opinion that he doubted

that a challenge would be made.

39

The use of the veto by some governors has been their political
undoing.

Governor A. Burke’s veto of a bill, by the farmers’ alliance,

helped to defeat his try for a second term.

40

Governor Allin’s veto

37prand Forks Herald, March 21, 1943, p. 1.
33prescott, p. 108.
3%ersonal interview with member of the Legislative Research
Staff.
Ilf)

Lounsberry, Early History of North Dakota (Washington:

Liberty Press, 1919), pp. 425-426."

of appropriation bills was the main factor that made Allin unavailable
41
as a candidate for re-election.
North Dakota governors when vetoing complete bills have
usually given detailed explanations in their messages accompanying
the veto to the legislature.

While messages on item vetoes have

usually been short, the standard statement usually has been "appro
priations exceed the estimated income."
A question arises when studying some of the appropriation
vetoes of Governor Langer in 1933*

There are some discrepancies

noticeable in the money figures in some of the bills.
is Senate Bill 46:

A good example

An Appropriation for Capitol Building and Grounds.

The legislature appropriated $78,626.00 in this bill.
partial veto message, he approved $69,050.00.
reduced the amount $9,576.00.

In Langer's

Or in other words, he

Further on in his message, the

Governor listed each separate reduction in the bill.

These reductions

are listed below:
Maintenance reduced to $50,000 from $56 ,076 .
Improve and repairs reduced to $2,500 from $5,000.
Trees, shrubs reduced to $1,000 from $3,000.4^
The total amount reduced in the three items listed above was $10,576
or a $1,000 difference between the Governor's statement as to how
much he would allow and "his itemized statement in the veto message.
No explanation for this discrepancy or others found in similar
appropriation bills could be found.

The original Senate Bill 46 was

41

/
Lewis F. Crawford, History of North Dakota, Vol. I (Chicago
and New York: The American Historical Society, Inc., 1931). P* 384.

^torth Dakota, Session Laws, 1933. pp. 47-48.

studied by this writer in the Secretary of State's vault, and the
wording is identical with the veto message found in the Session Laws
of 1933*
There has been one major court decision relating to the
gubernatorial veto in North Dakota.

House Bill *+10 was vetoed by

Governor John Burke after the adjournment of the legislature.

The

veto was challenged on the grounds that the fifteen day period for
vetoing after adjournment had elapsed.

The petitioners were of the

opinion that the bill was law because the Governor had not signed or
vetoed the bill in the allotted time period.
In the court case North Dakota State ex rel. Watkins v Norton
(1911) 21 N.D. ^73, 131 N. U. 257, the Supreme Court of North Dakota
ruled that Sundays were included in the fifteen day period.

In the

Court1s opinion:
The Framers of the Constitution were dealing with two
distinct periods of time having no similarity, and if they
intended to exclude intervening Sundays as to the larger
period of time fixed by them, it is reasonable to assume that
they would have expressly so provided. •'
This is the only override of a governor's veto in North Dakota by any
other method than the two-thirds vote of the legislature.
There is evidence that two governors of North Dakota used the
veto power on concurrent resolutions passed by the two houses of the
legislature.

This is not possible at the present time.

Governor John

Burke vetoed a twenty-five dollar appropriation to the Lincoln Farm
Association for the purchase, development and preservation of the

^ American law Reports Annotated, Vol.
Andrews Printing Co’., 1928), p. 3^1.

5^ (Rochester:

E. R.

Lincoln farm in the State of Kentucky,

hjt

The other veto of a con-

current resolution was by Governor Frazier in 1917*

The resolution

would have provided for a special committee to investigate and report,
on legislation for relief of floods in the eastern part of the state.
Frazier cited a state supreme court opinion of 1909 in his veto
message on the construction of appropriations bills.

Frazier gave

a part of the court's opinion when he stated:
The general appropriation bill shall embrace nothing but
appropriation for expense of the executive, legislative and
judicial departments of the State, the interest on the public
debt and for public schools. All other appropriations shall
be made by special bills, each embracing but one subject.
Frazier's objection to the concurrent resolution was on the grounds
the act was not constitutional.

No definite amount of money was

provided for the purpose contemplated by the act.
Governors of North Dakota have, at times, accomplished their
aims by not actually vetoing the bill, but by threatening to veto
the bill.

It is almost impossible to determine the effects of a veto

threat on the legislators, but the threat may exist in the minds of
the legislators when they are determining legislation.

Governor

Killer, during the first session of the Legislative Assembly,
threatened to veto a Louisiana lottery bill.

The bill caused a great

deal of controversy at"the time and Miller's threatened veto aided
in preventing it from becoming law.
Miller:

The Bismarck Settler said of

"Let it be written on one of the brightest and cleanest

^Grand Forks Herald, March 2k, 1907. p. 1. For veto message
see March 27. 1907. p. 8. For complete text of this concurrent
resolution see Senate Journal, 1907. pp. 1C60-1061.
^Kouse Journal, 1917. PP* ^60-^61.
this resolution, p. 757*

Fraizer later approved

pages of history that the first governor of the State of North Dakota
was a nan of such integrity that the gang of lottery agents and
schemers counted in advance upon his veto."^

Miller didn't have

to veto the lottery bill because it failed to pass the Assembly.
One type of legislation that constantly received a threat of
a gubernatorial veto was on appropriation bills.

Governors at various

times have announced that they would cut or scale down items unless
the legislature presented him appropriation bills the governor
considered economically sound.

Governor Allin did this in 1895

when he threatened to veto appropriation bills, unless recalled and

hn

scaled down by the legislature. ' The threat was not successful
since Allin had to use the partial veto on appropriation bills.
A governor must use caution when he contemplates the threat
of a veto or he may find himself in legal difficulty.

Section 81 of

the North Dakota Constitution states the general punishment for a
governor who threatens use of the veto.

h8

The specific punishment is

found in the North Dakota Century Code 12-08-18.

Governor Langer

was attacked by the presiding officer of the Senate, Lieutenant
Governor T. H. H. Thoresen, for Langer's threat to veto appropriations.
Thoresen in a message to the Senate on the threat said:
A message came into this body threatening this Senate
that unless they did so and so that further appropriations

^ Grand Forks Herald, February 13, 1890, p. 2.

^ Grand Forks Herald. February 2h, 1895 « P» 1*
^North Dakota Constitution, Article III, Section 81.
^North Dakota Century Code, Vol. II (Indianapolis: The Allen
Smith Co., I960), p. 543. See Appendix B for specific punishment.

would be vetoed, in direct conflict with Section 81 of the
Constitution of the State of North Dakota.-5°
Thoresen accused Langer of using the veto as a club over the heads of
Senators causing many Senators to vote against personal convictions
on several bills in order to protect state institutions in their
home communities which would suffer if appropriation bills were vetoed.
The Herald records Thoresen as saying on this subject:
It is not true democracy to be forced to vote against your
own convictions, it is not a government of and for the people
if a legislator is not allowed to vote as his conscience
dictates but must follow the demands of one who wants to be
a dictator.51
Nothing happened to Langer because of his threatened veto, but the
possibility of legal action against a governor still remains if
someone should ever challenge the threat of a veto upon action of
the legislature.
The governors of North Dakota have received praise as well as
criticism for their use of the gubernatorial veto throughout the
history of North Dakota.

The veto of a bill might have an effect

on certain people, industry or business.
the veto, in various ways.

These groups may react, to

In the study of newspaper articles on

the governor’s veto, a great deal more criticism, rather than
complimentary material, is found over the use of the veto.

Beginning

with the first governor, criticism has been levied against many
governors for the use of the veto.

It was contended that Governor

Miller should be deprived of his veto power except passing upon the
constitutionality of any measure.

One critic thought that the

•5°Senate Journal, 1937» P* 1607.
5^-Grand Forks Herald, March 11, 1937* p* 1.

legislature was better qualified than the Governor to decide what
legislation was desirable because they were fresh from the people.
The Herald, in an editorial remarked that the critic evidently forgot
that the Governor and the legislature were elected the same day.
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One veto of a Senate bill by Governor Killer resulted in the
appointing of a Senate veto committee.

The committee was to examine

the reason assigned by the Governor for his veto and present their
findings to the Senate.

The Governor had listed several reasons for

his veto in his message to the Senate based mainly on conflicts with
rulings of the Supreme Court of Dakota Territory.

The Senate veto

committee reported that each reason given by the Governor was
untenable and not supported by authorities cited nor by the principal
invoked to maintain it.
The committee also reported that if the veto had been based
on the ground that the proposed legislation was superfluous, there
would have been some merit to the executive action.

The committee

also questioned why this illegal legislation had been permitted to
remain unquestioned on the statue books for the past five years.
One interesting quotation was used by the committee in its
report when the committee compared the present conditions to those
faced by the mayor of the city welcoming Henry of Navaire.

The

mayor said;
I know it is the custom to greet renowned warriors like
your Majesty with the thunder of cannon; but I have twentyone reasons why we cannot comply with such customs
1. We never had a cannon in this city;
2. We - -

^^Grand Forks Herald, March 11, 1890, p. 2
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Hold, said the King, your first is sufficient, we will
dispense with the remaining twenty.-53
The committee stated it could assign numerous reasons for its action,
but an all-sufficient and controlling one to its mind was that the
proposed legislation was parallel, just and constitutional.

In the

opinion of the committee, the Governor's veto was not based upon either
of the objections indicated, but upon erroneous application of the
law.
The committee's report did not have an effect on the veto of
Senate Bill 172.

Governor Miller's veto remained in force.

Governor Allin was praised by the Herald for vetoing appro
priation bills for other than political or popular reasons.

The

editorial states the Governor:
Doesn't care one iota for future political preferment or
approval for political reasons. He has simply performed
an act he thought best for the taxpayers of the State, and
he is doubtless perfectly willing to shoulder the full
re sponsibility.54
Allin by shouldering his responsibility contributed in bringing his
political life, as Governor, to an end.

His own political party

refused to nominate him for a second term of office.55

phe Governor

also experienced a great deal of protest for his reductions of money
to the state educational institutions.
Governor Briggs earned praise for his veto of a bill which
would have violated all Republican party pledges concerning prohibition.
The Herald editorial page comments on the veto of House Bill 209:

53senate Journal, 1889-90, pp. 831-32.
^Grand Forks Herald, March 23, 1895, P* 2.
55Lounsberry, p. 428.

The veto shows Briggs to be what the Republican partybelieved when they nominated him, and what the people believed
when they elected him — a loyal and independent capable man
who could be depended upon to administer the affairs of state
ably, economically, honorably, in accordance with the known
wishes of the people and the Republican party.5°
Briggs’ vetoes of appropriations were also praised, on the grounds he
didn't have tine to study them and by using his veto he had made good
a campaign pledge.

This pledge was to place responsibility for all

evil consequences where it belonged - upon the legislature.
One method of handling appropriation bills was the method
used by Governor White.

In a stoxy about White and his handling of

legislation, the Bismarck Correspondent stated the Governor had been
kind to bills and had signed all but appropriation bills "these he
left to the tail end, as a kid leaves the good things to the last."-^
When asked what he would do with these bills, White replied:
I have set aside several of them for closer scrutiny.
They have been 'found guilty,' but are not yet sentenced,,
which would indicate a good pruning in the near future,
probably a day or two.5"
Governor White was attacked for vetoing a bill and signing
other legislation.

White vetoed two bills that would provide appro

priations for a childrens home in Fargo and one in Bismarck on the
grounds of economy.

A headline in the Herald read, "Governor White

Favored Thousands for Wolf Bounty But Not a Cent for Orphans."59
The tenure of Governor John Burke, the second Democrat elected

5%rand Forks Herald, March 13, 1897. p. 2.

^ Bismarck Correspondent as cited in the Grand Forks Herald,
March 18, 1903. p. 5*
58Ibid.

^ Grand Forks Herald, March 16, 1903. p. 1.
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governor, received criticism'over the use of the veto.

The Fargo

Forum and Daily Republican attacked the Governor for his veto of the
state penitentary bill as being political.

The writer thought that

if the Governor had signed the bill, I. P. Bailey, a well known local
Democrat, would lose his job as Treasurer of the Penitentary.

The

Governor was also criticized for his appropriation vetoes, because he
overlooked all measures relating to Devils Lake, his home town.^

The farmers of North Dakota were told that Burke trimmed them by his
veto and they were chided for electing him.

The Forum told the

farmer:
The action of the Governor shows the mistakes made by
Republican farmers in going to another party for an executive
who is antagonistic to their interest. . .Look over the list
and see where the farmers got Burke's knife right in the
neck. 1
■Whether the farmers took notice of this complaint is not known, but
the fact remains, Burke was re-elected in 1911 to a third term of
office, the first Democrat or Republican to receive this honor.
The influence of others upon a governor to exercise his veto
was attacked during Governor Frazier's administration.

A number of

Frazier's vetoes were denounced as being inspired by the work of
Arthur C. Townley.

The North Dakota Society of Equity denounced as

a Townley veto Senate.Bill 84 which the society had worked for. ^
Townley's influence was referred to in the Herald when it reported
on the Governor's actions.

The Herald said the bill was not vetoed

^°Fargo Forum and Daily Republican, March 22, 1909. p. 7*
6lIbid., p. 1.

^^Grand Forks Herald, March 8, 1917. p. 5*
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by the Governor but that the veto had been written and put in type
in the office of the Non-Partisan Leader days before Governor Frazier
had affixed his name to the document.

The hand of the Governor when he

affixed his signature was guided by the hand of Townley.0^
A veto of a reapportionment bill in 1923 gave Governor Nestos
a favorable commendation from some newspaper editors and political
opponents.

The Herald remarked that the Governor had risen above the

narrow lines of partisan politics and has acted with a high regard of
the laws of the entire state and not merely of the faction which
elected him to office.

6h

Support for one of Nestos' vetoes came from a man the veto
would hurt.

V. L. Mangura, the President of the Forestry School,

approved the veto which caused the discontinuance of that school.
President Mangum said the veto was for the good of the state as the
school did not fulfill local needs or command solid support from
Bottineau County.^

It is questionable if this type of support would

be forthcoming for a gubernatorial veto today.
At times legislators complained about the governor's use of
the veto or the language in the message accompanying the veto.
Governor Sorlie's veto of House Bill

In

83 , the Governor charged that

the bill was sponsored’by the insurance lobby.

Representative Traynor

took exception to the Governor's language in the veto message.

^ Ibid., March 17, 1917. p. 4.

^Grand Forks Herald, March 14, 1923. p. 4.
65Ibid., March 11, 1923, p. 3*
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Traynor said he wasn't sponsored by a lobby of any kind but acted
in the interests of his constituents.

66

A Langer veto of dairy funds received a retort from the
Commissioner of Agriculture and Labor in 1933*

Commissioner John

Husby complained that the Dairy Commissioner would be reduced to a
position of riding a swivel chair and giving nothing to the state
because of lack of funds with which to operate.

Husby threatened

to close the office entirely and stated that what happened to the
farmers was the Governor's responsibility "This veto eliminates all
restriction on sanitation and is a blow to the health of the people."67

The Governor was also praised for reducing public expenditure
in accordance with the diminished revenues of the state.

It does not

appear that the method used to reduce items was an issue in 1933»
only that the state should operate within its means.
During the legislative session of 1937* Langer was accused of
using his veto power to gain control of the commissioners office of
the Veterans Service Commission.

Lieutenant Governor Thoresen also

attacked Langer for his vetoes of appropriations of two schools:

Surely if he was looking for something to veto, which he
undoubtedly was, he could have found something else, something
not so vital as our educational institutions. But something
else would not have been dramatic enough for the chief executive
of this state. That we have launched ourselves on a period of
turmoil and upheavel appears certain.
This criticism came from a Republican executive official and was

°^Grand Forks Herald, March 3, 1927. p. 1.
67grand Forks Herald, March 27. 1933. pp. 1-2.

6^Grand Forks Herald, March 5. 1937. p. 10.
69Ibid.. March 9. 1937, p. 2

52
directed to another Republican executive officer.

At this tine in

North Dakota politics, the Republicans were split among themselves
giving way to many fights between the Republicans rather than between
the two political parties.

This is one factor in explaining the

number of vetoes registered by Governor Langer.
From the years 19^9 through 1959» there was little criticism
of gubernatorial vetoes.

During this period the executive and the

legislative departments were controlled by the same political party,
producing some degree of harmony.

In two of the six legislative

sessions, no vetoes were recorded and for the same time period, only
one appropriation bill was cut, that being Senate Bill 1 of 1953*
Table 8 on the following page gives a nineteen year comparison
on the extent of the gabernatorial veto in North Dakota and South
Dakota.

The chart indicates that the two states compared quite

closely in use of the veto.

The veto procedure is similar in the

two states except for two provisions.

The governor of South Dakota

has ten days after adjournment to act on legislation and for the
legislature to override a veto requires a two-thirds vote of the
members present in each house.

South Dakota has also adopted

annual sessions of the legislature which has allowed the governor
a greater opportunity to" veto legislation during the time period
indicated on Table 8.
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TABLE 8
COMPARISON OF GOVERNORS USE OF VETO IN NORTH DAKOTA AND SOUTH DAKOTA

Legislative
Session

No. of Bills Vetoed
South Dakota
North Dakota

1949
1951
1953
1955
1957
1959
1961
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967

5
4
4
0
3
13
17
5
6
5
2
6

5
5
4
0
0
4
9
16

Total

70

71

••
7
••

21

Sources: South Dakota Staff Memorandum Disposition of Bills
and Resolutions and Gubernatorial Vetoes of Bills, 1966 and 1967
South Dakota Legislature , State Legislative Research Council (Pierre,
South Dakota).
North Dakota Session Laws of the Legislative Assembly, 19491967.

Table 9 on the following pages indicates the action of the
Legislative Assemblies since the beginning of statehood for North
Dakota
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TABLE 9
VOLUME OF LEGISLATION AND VETOES, 1889-1967

Year
1889
1891
1892

3 893
1895
1897
1899

1901
1903
1905
1907
1909
1911
1913
1915
1917

1918
1919
1919

1921
1923
1925
1927

1928
1929
1931
1933
1935
1937
1937
1939
1941
1943
194!+
1945
1947
1949
1951
1953
1955
1957
1959

No. of Bills,

No. of Bills

No. of Bills

Resolutions
Introduced

Passed or
Became Law

Signed Before
Adjournment

597
457
7
349
337
411
398
458
525

528

686
734
8a
892
831
769
118
414
118
420
713
593

219
134
7
137
140
151
175
215
210
192
273

230
302
279
264
233
15

230
68
142
353
223

623

287

15
461

258

665

213

686
694
634
8
680
554
463
50

1

269
283

612
634

242
6
253
304
270
35
335
373
355
344
353
355
392

658

431

498
627
591
561

623

109
67
0
29
41
50
65
69
41
60
86
27

136
71
145
17
11
97
11
25
168
127
148
0
187
67
87
113
20
0
52
85
70
1

62
102
114
158
132
177
128
86

Vetoes
No. of
Vetoes

15
3
0
18
30
12
0
5
13
24
10a
20
20
43
2,
I8b
1
8
0
4
29
4
22
0
11
7
52
16
37
2
7
5
7
1
3
3
5
5
4
0
0
4

Before
Adjournment

5
0
0
2
3
10
0
0
1
0
2
2
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
6
0
1
0
0
1

a
0
0
1
1
0
2
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
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TABLE 9— Continued

Year
1961
1963
1965
1965
1967

Total

No. of Bills,
Resolutions
Introduced

No. of Bills
Fassed or
Became Law

No. of Bills
Signed Before
Adjournment

No. of
Vetoes

501

153
281
278
0
203

9
16
7
0
21

0
4
1
0
10

11.335

4,156

523

78

747
7'+9
813
17
849

391
426
458
8

24.685

aVetced a $25 concurrent resolution.
^Vetoed concurrent resolution.
Sources:

Vetoes
Before
Adjournment

House and Senate Journal Indexs 1889-1967.
North Dakota Session Laws 1889-1967*

Grand Forks newspapers.
Fargo newspapers.
Bismarck Tribune.
Fargo Argus.
Fargo ForuiTi and Daily Republican.

CHAPTER III

GUBERNATORIAL VETO AS EXERCISED
BY 'WILLIAM L. GUY, 1961-1967

The use of the gubernatorial veto by Governor William L. Guy
received a great deal of publicity during and after the Fortieth
Session of the North Dakota Legislative Assembly.

Statements to the

effect that Guy had set a reed’d for issuing gubernatorial vetoes
were made in the news media.

A large amount of the news coverage

was devoted to the seven vetoes that were overridden by the legislature.
The Herald reported that nobody around the legislature could remember
when three or more vetoes had been overridden.

The newspaper also

stated that Guy had passed Langer's total of forty-one vetoes.^"

The

publicity given to Governor Guy's use of the veto seems to indicate
that he has established some type of record for the use of the veto
power.

Does Governor Guy hold the "record" for issuing gubernatorial

vetoes in North Dakota?
chapter.

This question will be answered in this

A study of Governor Guy's use of the veto power is also

included in this chapter.
One record that Governor Guy can claim, without challenge, is
in having served as Governor of North Dakota longer than any other
person.

When the Fortieth Legislative Assembly convened in January

-1-Grand Forks Herald, March 1, 1967, p. 1.
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1967. Guy was in his seventh year as Governor.

The previous "record"

of longevity in office for any one governor was six years.

2

Another "record" Governor Guy could claim, without challenge
also, is in having dealt with more regular sessions of the legislature
than any previous governor of North Dakota.

During Guy's tenure, four

regular sessions of the Legislative Assembly have been held; the
previous high for any governor was three.

During these four regular

sessions, Governor Guy has had the adversity of being the chief
executive of the state and dealing with a legislature controlled by
the opposition political party.

Only once has Governor Guy been

favored with one house of the legislature being controlled by his
political party.

Table 10 shows the political party alignment during

the four regular legislative sessions that have met during Governor
Guy's time in office.

TABLE 10
POLITICAL PARTY ALIGNMENT IN THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY, 1961-1967

Year

Democrats

1961
1963
1965
1967

21
12
20
5

Source;

Senate
Republicans
28
37
29
44

Democrats

House
Republicans

41
43
65
15

72
70
44
83

Grand Forks Herald.

Faced with this political opposition during most of his
tenure, one would expect a governor to exercise his veto power more

2Grand Forks Herald, January 1, 1967 , p. 6.
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frequently than when the two branches are controlled by the same
political party.

The extent of Governor Guy’s use of the veto power

is indicated in Table 11.

TA3LE 11
VETOES OF GOVERNOR WILLIAM GUY, 1961-1967

Full
Vetoes

Year

1961

8

1963
1965
1967

15
5

Totals

^9

Item
Vetoes

Total
No.
Vetoes

0

21

$125,000
140,000
• •
• •

4
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$ 265,000

1

1
2

21

Source:

Amount
Itemed
Out

9

16
7

Vetoes
Before
Adjournment

No. Vetoes
Overridden

0
4
1
10

0
0
0
7

15

7

North Dakota Session Laws, 1961-1967 .

As Tables 10 and 11 indicate, in the two sessions of the
legislature that Governor Guy exercised his veto power the greatest
number of times,

1963 and 1967. the Republicans had nearly a two-

thirds majority in each house.

Even with this large political

advantage, the Republicans didn't override any of Guy’s vetoes until
the

1967 legislative session.
One factor for'the overrides in 1967 and not in

1963, was

that the legislature sent bills to the Governor well in advance of
adjournment.

By this action, the legislature forced the Governor

to act on the legislation presented to him.

North Dakota law requires

the Governor to sign or veto bills within three days if presented to
him prior to the last three days of the legislative session.

If

Governor Guy had failed to act on the legislation presented to him
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early in the session, the bills would have become law automatically.
Governor Guy objected to ten bills, of which seven were later passed
by legislative override and the other three bills were lost in the
Senate.^
In the year that Governor Guy exercised his veto power the
least number of times,

1965, the Democrats controlled one house of

the Legislative Assembly.

This unique situation, in North Dakota

political history, found the Governor vetoing five bills introduced
in the Republican controlled Senate and only two bills introduced in
the Democratic controlled House.

Only one veto was issued before

adjoumament, that being a Senate bill.

The chance that this veto

would be overridden, in lieu of the political division between the
two houses, was unthinkable.
Statements that Governor Guy holds a "record" compared to
other North Dakota governors over the use of the gubernatorial veto
can be challenged.
specific.

Most of these assertions are general and not

The type of veto issued by the governor as well as what

is included in the totals assigned to the various governors are not
clarified.
The statement that Governor Guy holds the record for vetoes
issued in one legislative session can be challenged.
one full vetoes in

Guy’s twenty-

1967 do not surpass the twenty-nine full vetoes

of L. B. Hanna in 1913 or William Langer's twenty-five in 1933*

Even

if one adds the item veto into the total number of vetoes, issued
during one session, Guy would not have the record.

3Senate Journal,

1967.

Governor Langer's

6o
fifty-two vetoes in 1933 and Governor Hanna's forty-three in 1913
surpass Guy's total.

Governor Guy's total, for a single session,

would still be twenty-one.
As to the assertion that Governor Guy issued more vetoes than
any other North Dakota governor, a clarification is necessary.

If

the claim is that Guy issued more vetoes than any other governor, it
wouldn't be true.

Governor Guy has issued a total of fifty-three full

and item vetoes while in office.

Congparing this with William Langer's

use of the veto, one finds that Langer issued a total of ninety-one
full and item vetoes while Governor of North Dakota - a record.
Governor Guy would be rightfully credited with the record if
the acknowledgement was for issuing full vetoes during tenure in office.
Forty-nine full vetoes have been issued by Governor Guy during his
seven years in office.
Langer.

The nearest competitor, in this category, is

During his three and one-half years in office, Governor

Langer issued forty-two full vetoes.
Any statement that Governor Guy has issued more item vetoes
than any other governor would be erroneous.

Guy issued only two

item vetoes in a single session while Governor Nestos issued eighteen
item vetoes in 1923.

If one considers Langer's pared or partial veto

as an item veto, then Langer has the record for a single session,
twenty-five vetoes in 1933*

Governor Guy's total of four item vetoes

during his tenure in office certainly would not be close to the
record.

Nestos and Langer would still retain this honor with the

eighteen item vetoes of Nestos' and the forty-nine of Langer's
version of the item veto.
A statement that Guy had more vetoes overridden than any other
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governor must also be clarified.

If the statement is based on full

vetoes overridden by the legislature then the seven full vetoes over
ridden in 1967 would stand.

But if this statement is based upon total

number of vetoes overridden, then the record would fall to Governor
Briggs whose ten item vetoes were overridden in 1897In a Herald interview, Governor Guy explained his interpretation
of the veto procedure.

Guy's veto procedure is similar to the pro

cedure explained earlier.

The Governor stated that when he vetoes

a bill he is required to send it back to the chamber of origination
listing his objections.

Then the chamber is required to act on the

original bill, not specifically on the Governor's objections.

Guy

commented that if it should happen that the legislators agree with
his objections the only way to refine the bill was to introduce it
anew through the delayed bills committee.

Guy also pointed out that

the Attorney-General has ruled that the governor's time limitations
are calendar days, not legislative days.

"They can even stop the

clock if they want to, and it makes no difference on the Governor's
If,
time limits, according to an attorney general's ruling," said Guy.
It was Governor Guy's opinion that this could lead to an
awkward situation if a session should go overtime.

The Governor

has fifteen days to sign or veto a bill after the sixty calendar days
of a regular legislative session.

If the legislature stopped the

clock and continued in session for five days, past the sixty calendar
days, the Governor would only have ten days in which to act on
legislation.^

^Grand Forks Herald, February 21, 1967 , pp. 1,
5lbid

?•
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If this situation did occur, it would seem an infringement
upon the Governor's veto power.

The Governor is allowed fifteen days

to study the legislation and act upon it.

To deny him the full fifteen

days to act, because the legislature extended the time limit, is unfair.
Under the Attorney-General's opinion, it could be possible for a
legislature to extend the session by "covering the clock," for sixteen
days and deny the Governor any time to consider the bills sent to
him when the legislature finally did adjourn.
This type of situation has not occurred in North Dakota, and
probably never will.

There seems to be an unwritten agreement between

the executive and the legislature that the fifteen day period applies
from the time the Legislative Assembly actually adjourns, and not
calendar days.

One possible avenue open to a governor, if such a

situation faced the governor, was proposed by Lloyd Omdahl.

A

member of Governor Guy's administrative staff, Omdahl, when questioned
on what would happen if bills didn't get to the Governor's desk within
the fifteen day period said, "We'd stop the clock in the governor's
office.
Whether this tactic would be successful or not, cannot be
ascertained until it is tried.

It seems only reasonable, that if the

legislature can pass bills after the sixty calendar days allowed by
the State Constitution, the Governor should be entitled to the full
fifteen days after the legislature finally adjourns.
In the same Herald interview, Governor Guy gave his opinion
on the item veto power of the chief executive.

6Ibid., March 9. 1967, p. 13.

Guy pointed out that

63
under current law, he can veto lined items in appropriation items.

'7

He cannot reduce or increase but can only veto or pass on the items.
This opinion, of the Governor’s, seems to indicate that Guy
believes that line items apply to more than just definite items of
money in appropriation bills.
Bills One and Two, in

His veto of items in Senate Appropriation

1965. did not involve definite sums of money,
g

but rather a transfer of funds between line items.
The actual procedure of vetoing a bill was demonstrated by
Governor Guy for two Carrington girls in the Capitol lunchroom.

The

Governor crossed out the section of the bill marked approved and
placed the time and date of 10:^5 a.m., February 25. on the space
marked disapproved; then he signed the measure.

The bill vetoed

9
would have permitted farming by corporations in North Dakota.
The procedure of handling bills presented to Governor Guy’s
office was explained by a member of the Governor's staff.

After the

bills are received in the Governor's office, they are taken to a
large room adjoining the main office.

The bills are placed upon a

large table and sorted according to the departments involved.

The

various department members read and study the bills pertaining to
their individual department.

The bills are checked closely for

terminology, spelling,"punctuation and clarity of intent.

If a bill

is found to contain errors, it is returned to the enrolling and engrossing
department for correction.

^Ibid., February 21, 1967. p. 7*
Q

North Dakota, Session Laws, I965.

^Fargo Forum, February 26, 1967. A-6.
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Bills that are judged correct and are favored will, in all
probability, be signed by the Governor.

The bills the Governor signs

while the legislature is in session are returned to the house of
origination along with the Governor's message stating that he has
signed the bills.
The bills that are objectionable to the Governor, and he
vetoes, will have an attached statement stating the reason or reasons
for the veto.

All the veto messages of Governor Guy have been written

by the Governor.

When the Governor vetoes a bill, during a legislative

session, he returns it to the house of origination with his veto
message.

If the veto is performed after the legislature has adjourned,

the veto and the message are filed with the Secretary of State within
the fifteen day limit.

If the Governor fails to sign or veto the

legislation, it becomes law.^®
Governors who exercise the veto power have found that problems
exist in the veto process and Governor Guy is no exception.

One

problem that has appeared is in the receiving of bills in the
Governor's office.
is not clear.

What constitutes delivery of bills to the Governor

The State Constitution states that a bill to become

a law must be presented to the Governor.

One questions if this

statement means that the bills must be delivered to the Governor
personally, or would presenting the bills to his secretary in the
Governor's office be the same thing?

Normally there isn't any

controversy over this matter, unless delivery occurs near the end
of the legislative session.

-^This procedure was explained by a member of Governor Guy's
staff during a personal interview at the Capitol, July 18, 1967.
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As it has been stated earlier in this study the Governor
has three days to sign or disapprove a bill before adjournment.

But

the final three days of a legislative session are considered a part
of the fifteen day period the Governor has after adjournment.
fore, bills received by the Governor during the

There

58th, 59th and 60th

day, if vetoed, are not required to be returned to the legislature
with the Governor's objections.
During the 1961 Legislative Assembly a situation occurred
that clearly shows the problem.

Senator Elton V/. Ringsak, Republican

from Grafton, complained that Governor Guy's office would not accept
eleven bills dispatched by a Senate messenger.

The bills were taken

to the Governor's office where the Governor's receptionist asked the
messenger if the Senate had adjourned.

The messenger replied "no."

The receptionist said that she could not accept the bills for the
Governor.

Senator Ringsak's point, on this matter, was that if the

Senate had adjourned it would have been in the

58th day of the session,

and if the Senate had not adjourned it would still be the 57th day.
According to Ringsak, bills received before the

58th day of the 60

day session are to be acted upon by the executive before the session
ends, but those received by the Governor in the last three legislative
days may be acted upon within the fifteen day period.

Normally a

legislative day ends at 2:00 p.m., but in this situation the legislature
had not ended its 57th day until l O : ^ p.m., Wednesday.

Thus, Ringsak

said:
Had the Governor taken the bills before the Senate had
ended its 57th day, he would have been obligated to act on
them before the session's end; but by refusing them then and
not taking them until the 58th day, he will have 15 days in
which to act. And by that time the legislature will be long
gone.
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Ringsak said he considered the action "a kid trick" on the part of
the Governor.
This criticism was answered by the Governor's office.

It was

explained that the procedure of not accepting any more bills than
could be checked and made ready for signing in the final three day
period was not new but was similar to the procedure of prior adminis
trations.

Lloyd Omdahl said the Governor didn't know of the incident

but tnat receptionist Mrs. Becky Zoller, by not accepting more bills
than could be processed in the three day period, was following normal
procedure.
This explanation didn't satisfy Senator Ringsak.

The Senator

continued his attack by stating:
Since when, can or does a receptionist dictate the terms
of the governor's office as to receiving or not receiving
important bills of legislation which affect all of the people
of North Dakota7^-3
This controversy was not settled nor the answer presented as to what
constitutes receiving bills by the Governor during the 1961 legislative
session.
During the

1967 legislative session, one of Governor Guy's

staff received a telephone call from a member of the legislature.
it was late in the evening, the Governor's office was closed.

As

The

staff member was directed to come to the Capitol building and open
the Governor's office to receive bills.

The staff member did as he*
2
1

^ •Grand Forks Herald. March 2, 196l, p. 10.
12Ibid.
^-3ibid., March 3* 1961, p. 3*

67
was directed and the bills were received in the Governor's office.^
Whether this manner of requiring acceptance of bills is proper or not
is also unanswerable at this time.
There are other problems in the veto process, but one problem
Governor Guy hasn't faced is bills lest, stolen or strayed.

In

1889, an Australian ballot bill was stolen and the Governor couldn't
sign it.

In 1893* eight Senate and five House bills, that had passed

both houses, failed to reach the Governor for his action.

Somewhere

between the legislative halls and the Governor's office these bills
disappeared.

In 1891 a bill was stolen and an asking price of $2,000

was demanded for the bill's return.^

One doubts that any of these

situations would appear today.
Under the present executive alignment in North Dakota where
the Governor and the Lieutenant Governor are both elective offices,
a possible problem could occur over the veto usage.

Democratic

Governor Guy has had a Republican Lieutenant Governor for two of his
three terms and this study indicated that all was not harmony between
the two offices.

With this type of relationship, what would the

Lieutenant Governor do with the veto power if the Governor was absent
from the state or was unable to perform his duties.

It would seem

that the Lieutenant Governor acting as the Governor would have the
veto power.
history.

As yet this situation has not occurred in North Dakota

Normally during the sessions of the Legislative Assembly,

■^This incident was related during a personal interview by
this writer with two administrative assistants of Governor Guy on
July 18, 1967, at the State Capitol building.
argo Forum, March 6, 1893. P* !•
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the Governor is not absent from the state.

But there are examples of

where the Lieutenant Governor has signed bills in the absence of the
Governor.
Governor Guy in attending the inauguration of Fresident
Kennedy in 1961 presented the Lieutenant Governor the opportunity to
veto legislation.

The Lieutenant Governor didn't take advantage of

the opportunity but rather he criticized Guy for leaving the state
for political publicity.^

The way the political line up has been

in North Dakota, predominately Republican in the legislature and the
executive branches, one doubts that a Lieutenant Governor will ever
exercise the veto power, but the possibility still exists that it
could happen, and it would add another page to the colorful pages
of North Dakota political history.

To prevent this possibility it

may be an advantage to have the Governor and Lieutenant Governor
elected as a team, rather than individually, insuring that the
Governor and Lieutenant Governor are of the same political party.
Governors of North Dakota have received praise as well as
criticism over their use of the gubernatorial veto and Governor Guy
is no exception.

Guy has probably received more publicity over his

use of the veto than the previous governors primarily because he
has been Governor longer than any other person.

The increase in the

various types of news media and the improvement of these means of
communication have also contributed to the publicity that Guy has
received.
Governor Guy, a Democratic Governor seemingly surrounded by

•^Grand Forks Herald, January 28, 1961, p. 8.
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Republicans, appears to receive more criticism than praise over the
use of the veto.

Not only have a number of Republicans criticized

Guy but some Democrats have disapproved of his use of the veto too.
There is also evidence that both political organizations have, at
times, supported the Governor’s actions.

A gubernatorial veto ■will

affect different groups and interests in various ways as Governor Guy
found out.
A great number of the Republican charges are that Guy vetoes
for political reasons.

Senator Evan Lips, Senator Majority Leader in

1967, states this fact:
The historic number of vetoes which the 'Governor has
imposed on good legislation that would have been beneficial
to our State, proves, beyond a doubt, that he has only his
political future in mind and not the State of North Dakota. '
Bruce Streibel, House Floor Leader, remarked after a Guy
statement:
It was the first time that I had seen a public official
attempt to label conservatives as spenders.
Guy, according to Streibel, was placing priority on politics rather
than on concern for people.

18

Robert KcCarney was another Republican who thought Guy wasn't
doing all the vetoing for the people of North Dakota.
referred to Guy as "the fastest pen in the W e s t . I f

McCarney
the Governor

was considered fast by McCarney, then the legislature was equally as*
8
1

^ I b i d ., March 12, 1967. p. 24.
18Ibid., March 10,

1967, p. 16.

•^Ibid., March 18, 1967. p. 4.
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fast.

It took the House five minutes to override Guy’s veto of the

partial personal property tax after getting his veto message.*®
Larry Erickson, Democratic party chairman, observed that
another veto was overridden within minutes after being received.

In

a statement on the speed in overriding Governor Guy's veto of the
corporate farm bill, Erickson said*
The House overriding Governor William Guy's veto of the
corporation farm bill a few minutes after receiving it was
+o deny the voters of this state an opportunity to contact
their representatives.
The majority opinion of our citizens is against the
corporation farm bill. The bill is an open gate for every
stray million dollars to come into this state to outbid the
family farmer for any available acreage.21
The Herald commented on Guy's veto of the partial personal
property tax, that the veto seemed politically motivated.
accused the Governor of trying to make votes from vetoes.

The paper

22

When some of Governor Guy's vetoes came under attack other
people defended his action.

Guy's veto of the bank interest rate was

considered politically motivated by the executive secretary of the
North Dakota Banker's Association.

William Daner said of the veto,

"It was another in a series of the Governor's politically motivated
vetoes."*^

state Democratic party chairman, Larry Erickson, took

exception to Daner's criticism of Guy, by relating that the
Republicans had campaigned deploring high interest rates, but couldn't
wait to raise them even higher when given the opportunity.

Erickson

reminded Daner of the North Dakota Banker's Association Convention2

2-*-Ibid., February 28, 1967, p. 10.
22ibid., March *+, 1967, p.

23ibid., March 16, 1967 , p. 11.
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held at Williston two years earlier.

At this convention banners and

posters promoting Republican legislators and congressional candidates
flooded the hall.

The convention was even halted long enough for

the Republican party to take up a collection right on the floor,
according to Erickson.

Daner w'as asked by Erickson how he could

consider the Republican legislature's raising interest rates as not
being political, yet consider it political when the Governor vetoed
such rates.
Governor Guy also had some personal views over political
motivations on this same bill.

Guy in a speech to the Democratic

Legislative Advisory Committee, stated that there was a possibility
that the Republican controlled legislature of

1967 did not want to

override his veto of the bank interest rate bill.

The Governor had

informed the committee handling this legislation that he would veto
the bill increasing minimum rate interests from seven to eight per
cent.

This bill would have applied to banks and lending institutions.

According to Guy the bankers were among the main supporters of the
Republicans in the last campaign.

Even with the advanced warning

of the veto, the bill didn't reach the Governor until the legislature
had gone home, thereby preventing a chance to override the veto.
Guy said:
Republican majorities had complete control over legis
lation and timing, but these increased interest bills came to
me after the legislature had left. This indicates to me that
the Republican party is grateful to the banking fraternity,
but decided to pay them off in confederate currency.

^ Tbid., March 16,

1967, p. 11.

2^Grand Forks Herald, March 22, 1963, p. 1.
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Governor Guy was also accused of playing politics in
over the use of the item veto.

1963

The Governor had itemed out $140,000

from appropriation bills that provided funds for the operation of
various state departments.

Guy received criticism from the Republicans

but this was to be expected as the cuts were in departments headed by
Republicans.
C. P. Dahl, who was the Republican appointed Director of the
State Laboratory Department, had his salary appropriation itemed out.
Dahl complained that the Democratic Governor's action was 'purely
political.'2^

Guy indicated that Dahl's salary could be paid from

the money authorized for clerk hire to be spent for inspection, some
of which was being used for political purpose.

27

The Governor didn't

go into detail on this political charge.
State Insurance Commissioner Frank Albers had his travel
expenses itemed out of the appropriation bill involving his department.
Albers said that Guy's vetoes were in departments headed by Republicans
and he added:
. . .he’s (Guy) still sore because he couldn't get the
best of Jensen and he's taking it out on me.*
28
7
2
A.J. Jensen was the former Republican Insurance Commissioner who,
before he retired in 15.62, had battled Guy many times.

29

On the same veto Guy drew criticism from Representative James
W. Johnson, also a Republican.

Johnson said that if Guy wanted to

2^Ibid., March 22, 1963, p. 1.
27Ibid.
28Ibid.

^Ibid
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save money, the Governor could have reduced his own appropriation.
Guy was accused of ’spite politics' by Johnson for making the cuts.
The Herald records Johnson’s statement:
By these vetoes our Governor has certainly signified
that to him spite politics is more important than efficient
administration of our state departments. . .In the interests
of sound state government, the Governor could far better
have reduced his own appropriations if saving money was
his only motive in the vetoes which he made.-'®
No one person is apparently safe from political attack over a
gubernatorial veto.

Only the Governor can sign a veto message, but

there are times when people close to him also receive criticism.
Commissioner of Labor Orville Hagen commented after a Guy veto:
It appears that politics was the main reason for vetoing
House Bill 655* Governor Guy, his Administrative Director,
Lloyd Omdahl, and Dockter apparently did not want the Repub
lican controlled legislature to have credit for enacting this
legislation.-'1
Wallace Dockter, President of the North Dakota AFL-CIO Labor
Union, could not be blamed if he had mixed emotions for being included
in Hagen's charge.

Earlier in March of the same year, Dockter had

complained about a Guy veto of the personal property tax bill.

32

Governor Guy was criticized for failing to sign four revenue
bills in

1963, and allowing the bills to become law without his

signature.

Fay Brown attacked Guy by saying:

I am sure by now the citizens of North Dakota are well
aware of the phony double talk by the man occupying the
Governor's office, who puts the interest of special groups
ahead of that of the welfare and good of all the people of
North Dakota.33

3°Ibid., p. 7.
31Grand Forks Herald, March 17, 19 67 , p. 9*
32Ibid., March 5» 19^7 * p. 26.
33grand Forks Herald, March 26, 1963 , p. 1.

74

On the day before Brown's criticism, Governor Guy, after allowing the
four revenue bills to become law, belittled the Republican controlled
legislature.

The Governor stated that he would have vetoed these bills

and called a special session if he thought the majority party could
improve their tax program.. Guy remarked:
But how could a Republican majority be expected to
improve on something that took a record ?0 days to do in
the first place.
If the people of North Dakota thought that Governor Guy had
put the interests of special groups ahead of them, as Brown said, it
was not indicated by the election of 1964.

Governor Guy was elected

to a third term of office by the people of North Dakota, and also
became the first Governor elected to a four year terra of office.
Governors have changed their viewpoint on legislation and
Governor Guy is no exception.

In 1961, Guy signed a bill prohibiting

any North Dakota city from going on daylight saving tine.

In 1967 the

Governor vetoed a bill that would exempt North Dakota from daylight
saving time.

The Governor listed eleven reasons for his veto of this

bill, and said that he had done more research on this bill than on
any other to cross his desk.

Guy stated that his reason for changing

his view was not because he opposed standard time, but that he desired
North Dakota to be on the sane time as the rest of the nation.

The

Governor was concerned about the heavily populated North Dakota
counties bordering next to Minnesota.

Guy said that these counties,

"would be heavily disadvantaged if we did not observe uniform time."35

3^lbid., March 25, 1963, p. 1.
3-5ftorth Dakota, Session Laws, 1967*
Bill 91

Veto Message Senate
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In 1965 Governor Guy changed his view over legislation
previously vetoed when he signed a bill that permitted an increase
in trunk lengths from sixty feet to sixty-five feet.
o£
had vetoed a similar bill..

In

1963 Guy

Governor Guy also changed his view over corporate farming.
During the 1963 legislative session, Guy favored a limited corporate
farming bill that would have changed the 1932 law forbidding any
corporate agriculture operation in the state.

There was enough

opposition from the Governor's political party to prevent the bill
from becoming a law.
legislative session.

A similar situation occurred in the 1961
37

During the

1967 legislative session Guy vetoed

a corporate farming bill even though he indicated the bill could hold
advantages for him in his farming operation.^
In exercising the gubernatorial veto during the
session, Governor Guy must have had many mixed emotions.
suggested how Guy must have felt during the hectic

1967 legislative
One writer

1967 session.

L. J. Dewing reported in the Turtle Mountain Star:
I am quite sure that Governor Guy feels like he has been
virtually left to fight the battle of state affairs alone, as
he surveys the multitude of Republicans hurtling in and out of
the legislative chamber doors, hallways and coat rooms. He
could not be faulted if he is getting a feeling that there
are more Republicans than people in Bismarck. He sees all
his poor little vetoes go for naught as the legislature
gobbles each one he hurls at it and gleefully overrides it.
I'll bet he is even beginning to wonder if anyone will
listen to him when he shouts 'no' at home anymore. 39

3^Grand Forks Herald, March 17. 1965, p. 1.
37grand Forks Herald, January 27, I963, p. 1.
3^Grand Forks Herald. March 2^, 1967, p. 9^ Turtle Mountain Star as cited in the Grand Forks Herald,
March 12, 1967, p. 6.
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The legislature didn't 'gobble' each veto, nor did it 'override each
veto' as Mr. Dewing implies.

Three vetoes were sustained by the

Senate.
Governor Guy did receive support over some of his vetoes in
1967.

The Mandan Morning Tribune supported two non-political vetoes.

The veto of a bill allowing unlimited speed on the interstate highways
and the daylight time action of the Governor were favored by the
newspaper.

It reasoned that the action put the state more in line

with what other states were doing.

The Herald didn't believe the

Governor acted wisely or in the best interests of the state in all
of his vetoes, but it did approve setting aside the measure that would
have eliminated traffic speed limits on certain interstate highways.^
The use of the gubernatorial veto by Governor Guy will no
doubt have an effect on his political future,

possibly the measures

selected by Guy to veto will be the issues in the I968 election
campaign.

According to the Mandan Morning Tribune;

"Whether it is Guy or someone else carrying the Democratic
banner, that candidate will run against a 1967 Republican
legislative record. One can expect to hear in the months
before the election about corporate fanning, pollution,
increased sales tax, tax loopholes and reform, increased
interest rates, taxing cooperatives, and many other
subjects. :
^
The Herald predicted that Guy will be defeated if he runs for a
fourth term.

In the editorial, the writer believed that Guy had

uoManaan Morning Tribune as cited in the Grand Forks Herald,
March 19, 1967. p. 19.
^^Grand Forks Herald, March 21, 1967, p. 4-.

hp

Mandan Morning Tribune as cited in the Grand Forks Herald.
March 6, 1967. p. 9»
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certainly done enough for the state, or done the state enough,

L')

depending on the individual viewpoint. J

If Governor Guy decides to run for a fourth term, it will
be interesting to see if the Herald's prediction is correct or not.
It will also be interesting to see what viewpoint the individual voter
takes on the performance of Governor Guy.
In the study of Guy's use of the veto, one finds many areas
of legislation vetoed.

The Governor's messages are clear as to his

reason or reasons for issuing the veto.

Governor Guy stated that his

reasons were in the public interest or not good policy.

The use of

the gubernatorial veto by Governor Guy cannot be considered excessive,
when compared to the history of the veto usage in North Dakota.
Considering that political party differences existed between the
executive and legislative branches during Guy's tenure of office and
that the voters elected Guy to the office of Governor three times,
one might expect the Governor to act in the manner he considers to
be in the best interests of the people who placed him into office.
43 Grand Forks Herald, March 12, 1967, p. 4

CHAPTER IV

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Summary
The Northwest Ordinance established an absolute gubernatorial
veto for the early Dakota Territorial governors over acts of the
territorial legislature.

Congress, later, changed the organic law

to allow the territorial legislature to override the executive veto
by a two-thirds vote of each house.

The governor retained an absolute

veto over legislation after the adjournment of the legislature.

The

item veto was not included in the veto powers of the Dakota Territorial
governors.

The power to veto legislation of all types was retained

by the territorial governors of Dakota until statehood was achieved
for North and South Dakota.
Governors of North Dakota have had the veto power since the
beginning of statehood.

There has been one constitutional amendment

relating to the gubernatorial veto power since the adoption of the
North Dakota State Constitution.

The governor has three days in which

to veto or sign a bill during the legislative session and fifteen days
in which to sign or disapprove after adjournment of the Legislative
Assembly.

The legislature may override a veto by a two-thirds vote

of the members elected.
since statehood.

The item veto has been available to governors

In 1919 the governor was given authority to veto

acts of the State Industrial Commission.
veto, but is still a type of veto power.
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This is not a legislative
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The power to veto initiated or referred measures is denied to
North Dakota governors by the State Constitution.

Only one Supreme

Court decision has been rendered on the constitutional veto power of
the governor.

The ruling stated that Sundays were to be counted as

a part of the fifteen day time period after adjournment.

Conclusions
The evidence gained from this study indicates that almost all
the Dakota Territorial governors used the veto power over territorial
legislation.

There is no definite pattern on the use of the veto

by the territorial governors.

Many different types of legislation

were vetoed by the different governors.

The evidence also indicates

that when the Dakota Territorial Legislature gained the authority to
override a gubernatorial veto, the Assembly didn't hesitate to
exercise this power.

A part of the problem, that caused vetoes to be

overridden, was due to the fact that executives were appointed by
the President of the United States and the legislature was elected
by the people of the territory.

Also, the political party differences

and the independent thinking of the people of the territory had a
part in the veto problems of the territorial legislature.

Evidence

was also found that at.least one Dakota governor desired the item
veto power, but he was not granted this authority by the Congress.
It can be stated that politics was very evident when the Dakota
Territorial governors used the veto power.
The use of the veto by the governors of the State of North
Dakota exhibits no definite pattern.

All but one governor has

exercised the gubernatorial veto when given the opportunity to do so.
It has been exercised by both Democrat and Republican governors.

A
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greater number of vetoes were cast by Republican than by Democratic
governors.

However, there have been more Republican than Democratic

governors in the state.
When there have been political party differences between the
executive branch and the legislative branches, the veto power was
exercised more freely than when the two branches were controlled by
the same party.

Even when the governor and the legislature are of

the same political party there seems to be no guarantee that the veto
will not be exercised.

Differences within the Republican party led

to Governor Langer's extensive use of the gubernatorial veto.
This study also indicates that in periods of economic distress,
the veto will be used more often than during periods of prosperity.
During times of national emergencies, such as war, the veto has not
been used to any extent by North Dakota governors.
More gubernatorial vetoes are exercised in North Dakota after
the adjournment of the Legislative Assembly than during the session.
The Legislative Assembly is to a large extent responsible for many of
these vetoes because of the large amount of legislation passed just
prior to adjournment.
The veto power has not been abused by North Dakota governors
when compared to a number of other states.

The North Dakota governors

seemingly have not used their veto power in haste or without considerable
thought.

When one reads the veto messages of the various governors,

this point seems quite clear.

Charges that a great many gubernatorial

vetoes in North Dakota are politically motivated cannot be answered
by this study.

There are indications that some of the 523 vetoes

were political, but only the men who issued the vetoes could answer
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these charges.

There are no indications in the veto messages that

the governor’s reasons were political.
This study also gives no evidence that the item veto has been
abused by any one governor.

The amounts of money deleted or reduced

from appropriation bills have been primarily in the interests of
economy and keeping expenditures within estimated income.

Just what

the governors item veto power actually involves will never be
absolutely clear until the North Dakota Supreme Court clarifies it
by a court ruling.
It would seem that future North Dakota governors will use
their veto power when the governor deems it justifiable and in the
public interest.

The political history of North Dakota indicates

that the governor and the legislature will not always be in agreement.
It is safe to assume that governors will veto legislation in the
future and the Legislative Assembly will occasionally override a
governor’s veto.

Re commendati ons
The trend in state constitutional revisions is clearly
in the direction of giving the executive more time for delibera
tion on legislation.^"

The three day time limit for gubernatorial

consideration during the legislative session should be increased
to five days.

The large number of bills that are submitted to the

governor for his study would indicate the need for increasing this

■'■Joseph E. Kallenback, The American Chief Executive, the
Presidency and the Governorship (New York: Harper and Row, 1966)'.
p. 362.
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provision.

Only nine states limit the governor to three days for

action on legislation.

2

This writer would be in agreement with Lieutenant Governor
Charles Tighe for increasing the legislative session to longer than
sixty days.

Tighe said, "I am convinced that the amount of legislation

now being introduced cannot be given fair and adequate consideration in
the

60-day sessions every two years."3
The sixty-day constitutional limitation upon the Legislative

Assembly creates many problems.

Because of the short period allowed

for making laws, a great deal of legislation is passed in the final
days of the session.

The large number of bills reaching the governor's

office in these final days presents problems for both the governor
and the legislature.

By establishing annual sessions of the

legislature, meeting for a period of 120 days each year, may alleviate
some of the problems relating to the veto.

With the longer time

period, legislation could be sent to the governor at an earlier time
and would allow the legislature additional time to consider a guberna
torial veto.

The annual sessions seemingly would make the legislature

more responsive to the needs of the state and perhaps would allow
closer supervision over the joint actions of the executive and
legislative departments.
It is also recommended that the governor be given the power
to reduce items in appropriation bills.

This proposal was included

in a constitutional revision amendment in 1966 and failed.
p

Perhaps

Book of the States, p. 58 . Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota,
New Mexico, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota and Vfyeming.
3c-rand Forks Herald, July 25, 1967, p. 2.
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a single amendment should be offered to the people allowing the
reduction of items by the governor; perhaps a constitutional convention
should be held to modernize the entire Constitution, and this proposal
should be a part of the revision made.
Placing all constitutional changes in one amendment offers too
many proposals that might offend too many people, although perhaps
for varying reasons.

Such persons would vote against the amendment,

causing the whole amendment to fail.
Allowing the governor to reduce items in appropriations would
permit him to keep them close to his budget proposal.

The governor

would not be placed in the situation of having to accept or reject
each appropriation item.
It is also recommended that the Governor and Lieutenant
Governor be elected as a team, that is to say, of the same political
party.

This suggestion doesn’t directly apply to the veto povrer, but

it would prevent a possible situation as outlined earlier in this
paper

APPENDIX

A

NORTH DAKOTA CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
FOR THE GUBERNATORIAL VETO

ARTICLE III

SECTION 79

Every bill which shall have passed the Legislative Assembly
shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the Governor.

If he

approve, he shall sign, but if not, he shall return it with his
objections, to the house in which it originated, which shall enter
the objections at large upon the journal, and proceed to reconsider
it.

If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of the members-elect

shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the
objections, to the other house, by which it shall likewise be recon
sidered, and if it be approved by two-thirds of the members-elect,
it shall become a law; but in all such cases the vote of both houses
shall be determined by the yeas and nays, and the names of the
members voting for and against the bill shall be entered upon the
journal of each house respectively.

If any bill shall not be returned

by the Governor within three days (Sunday excepted) after it shall
have been presented to him, the same shall be a law, unless the.
Legislative Assembly, by its adjournment, prevent its return, in which
case it shall be a law unless he shall file the same with his
objections, in the office of the Secretary of State, within fifteen
days after such adjournment.

8^
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ARTICLE III

SECTION 80

The Governor shall have power to disapprove of any item or
items, or part or parts of any bill making appropriations of money
or property embracing distinct items, and the part or parts of the
bill approved shall be the law, and the item or items, and part or
parts disapproved shall be void, unless enacted in the following
manner:

If the Legislative Assembly be in session he shall transmit

to the house in which the bill originated a copy of the item or
items, or part or parts thereof disapproved, together with his
objections thereto, and the items or parts objected to shall be
separately reconsidered, and each item or part shall then take the
same course as is prescribed for the passage of bills over the
executive veto.

ARTICLE III

SECTION 81

Any Governor of this State who asks, receives or agrees to
receive any bribe upon any understanding that his official opinion,
judgment or action shall be influenced thereby, or who gives or
offers, or promises his official influence in consideration that
any member of the Legislative Assembly shall give his official vote
or influence on any particular side of any question or matter upon
which he may be required to act in his official capacity, or who
menaces any member by the threatened use of his veto power, or who
offers or promises any member that he, the said Governor, shall
appoint any particular person or persons to any office created or
thereafter to be created, in consideration that any member shall
give his official vote or influence on any matter pending or hereafter
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to be introduced into either house of said Legislative Assembly, or
who threatens any member that he, the said Governor, will remove any
person or persons from office or position with intent in any manner
to influence the action of said member shall be punished in the manner
now, or that may hereafter, be provided by law, and upon conviction
thereof shall forfeit all right to hold or exercise any office of
trust or honor in this State.

ARTICLE II

SECTION 25

AS AMENDED BY ARTICLE 15 AND ARTICLE 26 OF

AMENDMENTS
The veto power of the Governor shall not extend to the
measures initiated by or referred to the Electors.

No measures

enacted or approved by a vote of the Electors shall be repealed or
amended by the Legislature, except upon a yea and nay vote upon roll
call of two-thirds of all the members elected to each house.

APPENDIX B

PUNISHMENT FOR VETO THREAT

North Dakota Century Code 12-08-18.

Governor receiving bribes.~

Any person holding the office of governor of this state who:
1.

2.

3.
4.

5.

Asks, receives, or agrees to receive any bribe upon any
understanding that his official opinion, judgment, or
action shall be influenced thereby;
Gives, offers, or promises his official influence in
consideration or upon condition that any member of the
legislative assembly, or either house thereof, shall give
his official vote or influence on any particular side of
any question or matter upon which he may be required to
act in his official capacity;
Menaces any member of the legislative assembly, or either
house thereof, by the threatened use of his veto power;
Offers or promises any member of the legislative assembly,
or either house thereof, that he, the said governor, will
nominate for appointment or appoint any particular person
or persons to any office created or thereafter to be created,
in consideration or upon condition that any such member
shall give his official vote or influence on any matter
pending or thereafter to be introduced into either house
of the legislative assembly; or
Threatens any member of the legislative assembly, or
either house thereof, that he, the said governor, will
remove any person or persons from any office or position
held by such person or persons under the laws of this
state, with intent in any manner to influence the action
of said member',

shall be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not less
than one year nor more than ten years, or in the county jail for
not more than one year, or by a fine of not more than five thousand
dollars, or by both such fine and imprisonment, and upon conviction
of any of the offenses mentioned in this section, shall forfeit any
and all right to hold any office of trust or honor in this state.
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